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On Law’s Tiebreakers
Adam M. Samaha*

Tiebreakers are familiar tools for decisionmaking. Ready examples
include penalty shootouts in soccer matches and vice presidents breaking
tie votes in the Senate. However, we lack a precise understanding of the
concept and a normative theory for the use of tiebreakers. This Article
strictly defines a tiebreaker as a kind of lexically inferior decision rule and
then builds justifications for tiebreaking decision structures. Concentrating
on situations in which ties are considered intolerable, the Article suggests
methods for either preventing ties or designing sensible tiebreakers. As to
the latter, tradeoffs are identified for the use of random variables, morally
relevant variables, and double counted variables within a lexically inferior
decision rule. Finally, the Article applies its conceptual and normative
lessons to three problems: the best design for affirmative action programs,
the proper interpretive method for legal texts, and the core function of
adjudication. The closing sections evaluate law and adjudication as one
large tiebreaker for the rest of social life, with contrasts and comparisons to
other major theories for the mission of the court system in the United States.
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Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise
whenever you can . . . . Never stir up litigation. A worse man can
scarcely be found than one who does this.†
If, now, the trier is operating under a system which requires him to
decide the question one way or the other, then to avoid caprice that
system must furnish him with a rule for deciding the question when
he finds his mind in this kind of doubt or equipoise.††
They were men of their times, and they were responding to the
norms of their times—to the hidden voices of the zeitgeist.†††

INTRODUCTION
Tiebreaking is a familiar practice, especially in games. At critical
junctures in a sporting contest, the rules of the game will prescribe a
method for declaring a winner when the competitors are otherwise even.
A tennis set tied at six games might be awarded to the winner of a
special one-game tiebreaker, a deadlocked soccer match might be settled
with a penalty shootout, and a football game might linger into sudden
death overtime. Draws are sometimes tolerated, even at the end of a
game. But the desire for drama generated by a decisive result within a
limited time frame seems to motivate game designers to deploy
tiebreakers.
Tiebreakers exist outside the gaming context as well, in places where
entertainment cannot be the justification. In a wide variety of situations
people rely on tiebreakers, at least in a loose sense of the word. Public
and private decisionmaking bodies routinely break tie votes by declaring
that the motion fails,1 tied candidate elections are sometimes resolved by
drawing lots,2 and a motorist should yield right when reaching an
intersection at the same time as another motorist.3 For their part, courts
respond to equipoise with an assortment of norms—such as the rule that
civil defendants prevail when each side’s evidence is equally persuasive,
that judgments are affirmed by equally divided appellate panels, that
constitutional trial errors are deemed harmful when the habeas judge
cannot tell one way or the other, and that an agency’s reasonable
†

Abraham Lincoln, Fragment: Notes for a Law Lecture (1850), in Roy P. Basler, ed,
The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln: Supplement 18, 18 (1974).
††
Fleming James, Jr, Burdens of Proof, 47 Va L Rev 51, 51 (1961).
†††
Lawrence M. Friedman, Law in America: A Short History 42 (2002).
1
See Henry M. Robert, III, et al, Robert’s Rules of Order Newly Revised 392 (Perseus
10th ed 2000).
2
See note 10.
3
See text accompanying notes 27–29.

3

interpretation prevails when a statute seems ambiguous.4 Even the
Constitution of the United States has a tiebreaker. If and only if voting
senators are “equally divided,” the vice president may vote and thereby
break the tie.5
Despite numerous illustrations, we lack a solid investigation into the
phenomenon and theory of tiebreakers,6 especially in law.7 There is
much casual use of the term “tiebreaker” without a working definition of
the concept. And there is a practice of tiebreaking without a systematic
attempt to understand the forces that generate ties, the compulsion to
break them, and the best way to do so.
The most fundamental issue is why anyone would design a system to
ensure that ties are broken. Are ties so terrible? Even when they are, we
should know the best ways to prevent or break them. In particular, we
4

See text accompanying notes 195–202 (surveying some examples in law).
US Const Art I, § 3, cl 4 (stating that the vice president “shall have no Vote, unless
they be equally divided”). Ordinarily, Senate approval of a bill requires majority support
from a quorum of voting senators. See Walter J. Oleszek, Super-Majority Votes in the
Senate 1 (Congressional Research Service 2008) (relying on Senate precedent). This rule
produces a decisive outcome for numerically tied votes without resort to a special tiebreaker.
See David R. Tarr and Ann O’Connor, eds, Congress A to Z 472 (CQ 4th ed 2003) (“[A]
question on which the Senate is evenly divided automatically dies.”). But Article I, Section
3, Clause 4 is nonetheless a “tiebreaker” in the strict sense. See Part I.A.
6
A large literature in decision theory confronts uncertainty and other forms of
indeterminacy. See José Luis Bermúdez, Decision Theory and Rationality 22–27 (2009)
(describing basic elements of expected utility maximizing decision theory for such
situations); Simon French, Decision Theory: An Introduction to the Mathematics of
Rationality ch 2 (1986) (similar); David Kelsey and John Quiggin, Theories of Choice Under
Ignorance and Uncertainty, 6 J Econ Surv 133, 133–42 (1992) (collecting rational choice
models). See also Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgements: Studies in the Limitations of
Rationality 8–17, 107–08 (Cambridge 1989) (suggesting lotteries when reason runs out); R.
Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Surveys
278–86 (Wiley & Sons 1957) (discussing maximin utility, minimax regret, Hurwicz’s
best/worst state ratio, and the principle of insufficient reason for dealing with uncertain
probabilities across known outcomes). Compare Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under
Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of Legal Interpretation ch 6 (Harvard 2006) (applying
many of these strategies to issues of judicial interpretation). My investigation overlaps these
ideas.
7
For some narrower treatments in the law literature on related topics, see Michael P.
Healy, Communis Opinio and the Methods of Statutory Interpretation: Interpreting Law or
Changing Law, 43 Wm & Mary L Rev 539, 571–74 (2001) (distinguishing certain canons of
construction that operate as tiebreakers); Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme Court of
the United States, 44 Wm & Mary L Rev 643 (2002) (defending the rule that judgments are
affirmed whenever the justices are evenly divided); Fleming James, Jr, Burdens of Proof, 47
Va L Rev 51, 51–52 (1961) (discussing preponderance of the evidence); David Kaye, The
Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard: Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence
and Multiple Causation, 1982 Am B Found Res J 487 (1982) (discussing costs and benefits
of various proof burdens, including for situations of equally persuasive evidence in two-party
cases); Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97
Yale LJ 353, 382–84 (1988) (discussing compensation and consumer autonomy tiebreakers
that judges might use to fashion products liability law); Michael Coenen, Comment, Original
Jurisdiction Deadlocks, 118 Yale L J 1003 (2009) (assessing options for breaking ties when
there is no lower court judgment to affirm).
5
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should ask whether a rational decisionmaker would break a tie with a
variable that was relevant to the merits in the first place. Are variables
not simply relevant or irrelevant—rather than relevant only when other
variables cancel out? Other kinds of sequential decision structures make
more immediate sense, such as bifurcating trials and avoiding
unnecessary questions. It is no surprise when people try to prevent
considerations relevant to one decision from infecting a different
decision, or to save decision costs by resolving a potentially outcomedeterminative part of the analysis before taking up other parts. But
tiebreakers are more peculiar. They are designed to make exactly the
same decision that another decision rule could not handle, and they are
not as flexible as a simple aversion to unnecessary judgments.
This Article lays a foundation for a theory of tiebreakers, with
special attention to law’s tiebreakers. Insofar as a legal institution must
serve as a dispute resolution mechanism, ties are acutely troublesome in
that setting. More than fifty years ago, Fleming James suggested that
ties are a sign of distress within a system that cannot eliminate doubt,
that condemns decision by whim, and that nevertheless requires
decisionmakers “to decide the question one way or the other.”8 Legal
institutions need strategies for preventing or breaking ties, especially
when selection effects leave them in charge of the most intractable
disputes. Moreover, legal institutions will likely respond to the threat of
a tie in special ways. Mature legal systems might be uniquely able to
end a dispute as a practical matter, yet uniquely unable to acknowledge
indeterminacy on the issues that are supposed to govern outcomes on the
merits. In any event, law’s tiebreaking strategies may differ from the
suggestions of abstract decision theory, and understanding law’s
tiebreakers will help us understand legal institutions.
The Article begins by strictly defining a tiebreaker as a type of
lexically inferior decision rule. It also indicates that randomization is
often an ideal tiebreaker, assuming that a tie must be broken and that
there is no moral reason for demoting a relevant variable to tiebreaker
status. When randomization is unacceptable, the Article explains how
the probability of a tie can be reduced by moving a relevant variable into
a lexically inferior position. The reduction in ties from lexical ordering
is usually greater than the reduction from adding the same variable to the
mix of other relevant considerations. The cost, however, is a higher
error rate. A partial solution is to double count a relevant variable in the
8
James, Burdens of Proof at 51 (cited in note 7) (arguing that, “to avoid caprice,” the
judicial system must “furnish [the decisionmaker] with a rule for deciding the question when
he finds his mind in this kind of doubt”). James identified the burden of persuasion as a
device for resolving all cases of doubt or equipoise on questions of fact in litigation. See id
at 51–52. His point is important. However, adjustments to the proof burden are
“tiebreakers” only in a loose sense of the word. See Part I.A. (providing working
definitions). My goal is to explore the larger option set for both preventing and breaking ties.

5

case of a tie. This kind of double counting might generate problematic
incentives, but sometimes it is the best response when ties must be
broken and when randomization is unavailable.
With these tradeoffs identified, the Article comments on three
applications. The first involves affirmative action. These programs are
sometimes designed as tiebreakers and sometimes not. The second
application involves interpretive method. Some interpretive canons are
formulated as tiebreakers instead of presumptions, and many scholars
suggest that judicial ideology operates in similar fashion. The third
application is much broader and more speculative. I will suggest that the
institutions of law—and, more specifically, judicial adjudication—can
be viewed as one large tiebreaker for disputes that cannot be resolved by
the other arenas of social life. When law and courts are evaluated from
this angle, arbitrariness in adjudication becomes less problematic while
the law’s incorporation of values from the rest of society becomes a
potentially beneficial form of double counting.
The Article is organized into three parts. Part I presents loose and
strict definitions of a tiebreaker, and it acknowledges difficulties in
specifying the concept. Part II sketches justifications for tiebreaking
decision structures including the prevention of system overload through
screening, the presence of variables that are relevant but nevertheless
morally and categorically less important than others, the convenience of
political compromise, and the threat of otherwise intolerable stalemate.
This Part also identifies types of tiebreakers that are especially attractive
when ties are considered intolerable. If not altogether random,
tiebreaking variables meant to resolve episodic stalemates should be
relatively unimportant, cleanly decisive, and perhaps costly to evaluate;
sometimes they should amount to double counting a relevant variable in
case of a tie. Part III applies these lessons to affirmative action,
interpretive method, and judicial adjudication.
I. IDENTIFYING TIEBREAKERS
The sort of tiebreaker in which I am interested is easy to grasp as an
intuitive matter, but not so easy to define with the precision necessary
for detailed normative evaluation. This Part begins with a general
description of the concept, illustrative examples, and some relatively
formal definitions before proceeding to the resulting complications.
A. Definitions
The gist of the concept involves a decisionmaker resorting to a
special rule of decision to rank options that are somehow
indistinguishable without it. The decisionmaker is faced with mutually
exclusive options that are equally good, or that seem the same in relevant
ways, or that are incomparable under a prior rule of decision, and yet she
6

is compelled to select one option over another—to break the tie. This
setup indicates a looming and unwelcome stalemate, along with a
deliberate attempt by decisionmakers to prevent the system from
grinding to a halt. The envisioned system has a method for identifying
indeterminacy and a mechanism for moving forward regardless.
At the end of regulation time in soccer, for example, the ordinary
metric for victory is goals scored. However, if the two teams are tied on
this measure, and if a draw is unacceptable, then a so-called penalty
shootout might be prescribed as the method for selecting the victor.9
The shootout clearly is a tiebreaker, having no other role than identifying
the winner after regulation-time scoring fails to do so. Another example
involves candidate elections, where the ordinary metric for victory is the
number of lawful votes cast on or by some date. In some jurisdictions, if
the top vote-getters are judged to have received the same number of
votes, the victor is selected by a game of chance.10 Here, lots are the
tiebreakers. A soccer fundamentalist might scoff and say that penalty
shootouts are no different from drawing lots,11 but the key thought is that
tiebreakers of some kind are used to pick winners in the wake of both tie
scores and tie votes. We can draw on these examples to build working
definitions of ties and tiebreakers.
Put simply, “tie” means any equality relevant to an observer.12 Ties
come in many forms. The soccer and election examples show numerical
equalities that are the consequence of uncomplicated evaluative
9
See Fédération Internationale de Football Association, Laws of the Game 50–52
(2009) (describing three approved tiebreaking methods: alternating kicks from the penalty
mark, doubling the value of away goals, and extra time).
10
See, for example, Ariz Rev Stat § 16-649(A) (West 2006); Fla Stat Ann
§ 105.051(1)(c) (West 2008); Mich Stat § 168.851–852; Minn Comp Laws Ann § 204C.34
(West 2005); NM Stat Ann § 1-13-11 (West 2003); Va Code Ann § 24.2-674 (2006); Wis
Stat Ann § 5.01(4)(a) (West 2004); Randal C. Archibold, Election at a Draw, Arizona Town
Cuts a Deck, NY Times A1 (June 17, 2009) (describing an Arizona town council election
decided by picking cards). See also Finland Election Act pt I, ch 7, §§ 89–90 (1998)
(regarding the ordering by party of candidates for parliament). In Arizona, a tied recall
election goes to the incumbent, see Ariz Rev Stat §16-649(A)–(E), which is consistent with a
kind of status quo bias present in several of law’s tiebreakers. But I know of no statutes that
give the tie to an incumbent in a contested candidate election.
11
Compare Christian Celind, Penalty Shootouts—There Is an Alternative
(SoccerNews.com May 25, 2008), online at http://www.soccernews.com/penalty-shootouts--there-is-an-alternative/2434 (visited Feb 6, 2010) (“Despite its appeal for drama and
excitement, . . . a penalty shootout is merely a series of random shots in the dark.”). In the
1970s, coins actually were flipped to decide some soccer matches. See id.
12
See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1233 (10th ed 1999) (defining “tie” as,
among other things, “an equality in number (as of votes or scores)”). I have added the phrase
“relevant to an observer” to flag the fact that a tie depends on the metric that matters, and that
different metrics matter to different observers. Furthermore, even if all observers agree on
the relevant metric, different observers might come up with different measurements. Thus
competing parties (debaters, say, or litigants) might agree on the relevant issue and disagree
on which argument is better. A third party might begin by—or even end up—thinking that
the arguments of the first two parties are evenly matched. For this third party, there is a tie.
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methods. Only one measure is relevant to ranking the competitors, and
this measure is reduced to a whole number. If, however, we are
interested in the more general topic of options that are difficult to
distinguish, then there is no good reason to restrict the inquiry to
examples like these. There are several well-known impediments to rank
ordering aside from indifference or equipoise with complete information.
To this we can add uncertainty, ignorance, and incommensurability as
other forms of indeterminacy.13 Essential information regarding the
likely consequences of possible actions might be impossible to obtain or
too costly to gather; or the system might stall because the decisionmaker
is unable or unwilling to rank options that differ along more than one
dimension of value. The appropriate decision strategy might depend on
the type of indeterminacy, of course, but we can call each a tie.
This inclusive understanding of a “tie” allows for both loose and
strict definitions of a “tiebreaker.” I will rule out expansive colloquial
definitions, however, because they will not isolate interesting design
choices regarding decision procedures. Hence a decisive variable is not
necessarily a tiebreaker for my purposes. If three variables are relevant
to a decision and two of them cancel out, then the remaining variable can
be dubbed “the tiebreaker” in common parlance.14 But countless
decisions turn on one decisive consideration without the decisionmaker
paying any special attention to the phenomenon of ties. My interest is
13

See Elster, Solomonic Judgements at 8–17 (cited in note 6) (itemizing ways in which
rational choice theory may fail to recommend a unique result); Frank H. Knight, Risk,
Uncertainty and Profit 20, 231–34 (1921) (distinguishing mere risk from uncertainty); Kelsey
and Quiggin, 6 J Econ Surv at 133–42 (cited in note 6) (distinguishing decision under (1)
risk, where the probabilities for a set of consequences in a set of states are objectively known
for each proposed action, (2) uncertainty, where probabilities are not objectively known, and
(3) ignorance and deeper forms of uncertainty, where not even the set of states is known or
where the states-consequences structure is not known). A brief and nontechnical discussion
of uncertainty and uncertainty aversion is Eric L. Talley, On Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and
Contractual Conditions, 34 Del J Corp L 755, 763–69 (2009) (referring to ambiguity aversion
as a phenomenon that “grows out of the distinction between risk and uncertainty”). Note that
common definitions of incommensurability exclude cases in which the observer can say that
two choices are equally valuable, see, for example, Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom
322 (1986), so I am using the term “equality” so loosely as to include incommensurability.
Work on actual human behavior under conditions of “uncertainty” seems focused on
decisionmaking under known or estimated risks, especially stated risks. See, for example,
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Variants of Uncertainty, in Daniel Kahneman, Paul
Slovic, and Amos Tversky, eds, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 509,
515–20 (Cambridge 1982) (discussing uncertainty in terms of probabilities and confidence
levels); Ralph Hertwig, The Psychology and Rationality of Decisions from Experience
(2009) (unpublished manuscript) (investigating how people react to their experience with
risk, and contrasting their reactions to described probabilities).
14
See, for example, Metropolitan Life Insurance Co v Glenn, 128 S Ct 2343, 2351
(2008) (recognizing that “any one factor will act as a tiebreaker when the other factors are
closely balanced”); Matt Weiser, California Panel Adds New Marine Sanctuary Zone,
Sacramento Bee 3A (Aug 6, 2009) (identifying the new commissioner as the tiebreaker in a
3-2 vote); Karen DeMasters, Districting Tiebreaker, NY Times 14NJ5 (July 22, 2001)
(describing the nonpartisan appointee to a commission as the tiebreaker).
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the structure and content of decision rules, and so a useful definition of a
tiebreaker will describe decision procedures related to ties rather than
variables that happen to break them. Neither the go-ahead goal nor the
swing voter will count as a tiebreaker in the analysis below.
Furthermore, only a subset of all decision rules should qualify as
tiebreakers. Otherwise the territory is too large to address in one pass.
But which subset? Every decision rule breaks a tie broadly speaking, in
the sense that decision rules are supposed to rank options and the best
option cannot be clear before the observer in question applies the rule.
Even if we demand that a tie be broken beyond mere resolution of an
issue through the application of a decision rule, most rules will still
qualify as tiebreakers. Suppose that an observer cares about voting
strength and that there are an equal number of votes for and against a
motion. Any decision rule that tells us whether the motion passes could
be called a tiebreaker, including: (1) unanimous consent is necessary for
passage; (2) majority support is necessary for passage; (3) the side with
the most votes prevails and, if the vote is tied, flip a coin. Each of these
rules decisively resolves the case of a tie vote, even though some of
them pay no special attention to ties.15
One way to draw a line between them is to consider the purposes of
rule designers. The resulting definition will be somewhat vague but it
will be sensitive to conscious design choices related to ties. Thus
“tiebreaker” can refer to a decision rule that is, at least in part, purposely
designed to rank options that would otherwise be considered tied—
again, beyond the “tie” that always exists before a decision rule is
applied to an unresolved issue. This definition supposes that a metric for
evaluating options has been identified, that a comparison according to
this metric might be inconclusive, and that rule designers have
responded to this possibility. As such, the definition tends to distinguish
the first voting rule described above from the other two. A unanimous
consent rule falls outside of this definition, insofar as the rule is chosen
for reasons independent of the tie vote phenomenon.16 In contrast, a
majority vote rule might well be chosen partly to deal with tie votes.
When votes are the basic metric of victory, the system’s designers must
still decide whether to slant the voting rules toward the status quo,
15
Another way to make the point is to say that, theoretically, every decision rule can be
disaggregated into its applications. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr, As-Applied and Facial
Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 Harv L Rev 1321, 1334 (2000) (“[S]tatutes often
are best understood as encompassing a number of subrules, which frequently are specified
only in the process of statutory application.”). Some of these applications will happen to
break ties beyond resolution of uncertainty before application, but this does not mean that the
decision rule was designed to confront the issue of such ties.
16
See, for example, Robert D. Cooter, The Strategic Constitution 61–62, 111–14
(Princeton 2000) (observing that unanimity rules prevent coercive redistributive contests
while increasing transaction costs for reaching agreement on even socially beneficial
cooperation schemes).
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toward change, toward the vice president, or toward something else.
Demanding majority support for a motion to pass instead of majority
opposition for a motion to fail can reflect an aversion to instability where
motions and countermotions can return to the agenda. And a purposebased definition will certainly reach the introduction of a new variable,
such as a coin flip, solely to resolve ties.
However, there is reason to prefer a more restrictive definition that
captures only decision rules akin to the coin-flip alternative. That rule
speaks specifically to tie votes. A definition along these lines will
isolate a special breed of decision rule that is designed for nothing but
breaking ties. Moreover, the presence of a decision rule that singles out
ties indicates that a prior decision rule could not settle the matter. When
a decision rule breaks down, it effectively identifies a tie for which a
tiebreaker might be needed—a tie beyond that faced by every decision
rule before it is applied to an unresolved issue. As such, a tiebreaker in
the strict sense will come packaged with another rule that speaks to the
same issue but that is lexically superior.17 In our voting rules example,
only the third alternative has this quality: one subrule tells us to
compare voting strength, and a second subrule turns to a coin flip only
when voting strength is equal. Such tiebreakers are part of a decision
structure with lexical ordering. Strictly speaking, then, “tiebreaker”
refers to a lexically inferior decision rule that is designed to rank options
if and only if a lexically superior decision rule fails to rank those same
options.
To be clear, the strict definition does not require that the lexically
superior rule be normatively superior as well. This will be true in many
cases but not all. The first letter of a word is not morally superior to the
second letter within the rules for alphabetizing. Furthermore, lexically
superior rules can be mere gateways to important variables. A lexically
superior rule might be the preferred basis for merits decisions, while an
inferior rule tidies up a small set of close calls; or a lexically superior
rule might be a crude screening device, while an inferior rule includes
every variable relevant to a sound decision. Nor does the definition
exclude decision procedures that use the same variable in both lexically
superior and inferior rules. The content or application of the two rules
must differ in some way for ties to be broken,18 but the same variable
might appear in both rules.
What the strict definition does require is a segmented decision
structure in which a different decision rule takes over when a prior rule
17

Lexical (or lexicographical) ordering categorically prioritizes one factor or set of
factors over others. Alphabetizing is the paradigmatic form of lexical ordering: ordering
indicated by an earlier letter in a word always trumps anything suggested by a later letter.
See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 37–38 n 23 (1971).
18
“Do overs,” including new trials, are excluded from my definition of a tiebreaker.
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breaks down. This demand is satisfied by soccer shootouts and
candidate coin flips, but not by many of the most well-known decision
rules in law. The strict definition cannot reach interest balancing,
multifactor tests, or all-things-considered judgments. Thus neither the
Hand formula for negligence19 nor the Mathews factors for due process20
contain a tiebreaker, only a set of variables that are processed together.
Similarly, a presumption cannot generate a tiebreaker in the strict sense,
so long as it is mixed with other variables. If the jury in a criminal trial
is instructed to evaluate evidence in light of a presumption that the
defendant is innocent, neither the presumption nor the evidence of guilt
is reserved for tiebreaking purposes.21 Nor do elements of a crime, a
civil claim, or an affirmative defense constitute tiebreakers.22 Elements
are variables that must point in the same direction for a given side to
prevail, meaning that the relevance of any one variable is conditional on
the value taken by others, but no variable is in a lexically inferior
position compared to the others.
Furthermore, a bifurcated decision structure is not enough. A
tiebreaker must attempt to answer the same question addressed by the
lexically superior rule. Either ballot counting or lot drawing may tell us
who wins an election, but a bifurcated capital trial is different. In that
process, a jury is asked to consider the defendant’s guilt first and, if the
defendant is found guilty, consider whether to impose the death penalty.
The penalty phase is in no meaningful sense a tiebreaker for the guilt
phase. Rather, the jury is asked to answer two different questions for
two distinct purposes. Tiebreakers in the strict sense are conditionally
relevant variables that are designed to resolve the same question
addressed by the variables on which they are conditioned. This
restriction is a bit hazy and manipulable, but it helps stop the definition
short of all decision rules.
A situation that totters on the edge of the strict definition involves
sequencing variables to reduce decision costs.
Decisionmakers
sometimes realize that a theoretically relevant variable is especially
difficult or controversial to evaluate, and will therefore reserve
19

See United States v Carroll Towing, 159 F2d 169, 173 (2d Cir 1947) (“[L]iability
depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P.”).
20
See Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 334–35 (1976) (considering the interests of
different parties in different procedures in light of the effect on the error rate).
21
See Coffin v United States, 156 US 432, 460 (1895) (treating the presumption of
innocence as a piece of evidence in favor of the accused). See also Richard D. Friedman, A
Presumption of Innocence, Not of Even Odds, 52 Stan L Rev 873, 879–83 (2000) (translating
the presumption of innocence into Bayesian terms as a requirement that jurors begin with an
assessment that the prior odds of guilt are very low).
22
See, for example, Wiener v Southcoast Childcare Centers, 88 P3d 517, 519 (Cal
2004) (stating that plaintiffs must show duty, breach, and proximate cause to recover in
negligence). For a similar reason, one house of a bicameral legislature is not a tiebreaker for
legislation approved by the other house.
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evaluation of this variable unless it could make a difference. In simple
terms, a decisionmaker would have to be in equipoise or only leaning in
one direction before turning to the costly variable. An example might be
the norm of attempting to avoid resolution of constitutional issues in
adjudication.23 Such sequencing does produce a bifurcated decision
structure. But it does not include strict lexical ordering and so it does
not present the same tradeoffs as a tiebreaker strictly defined. If
decision-cost sequencing happens to fully bracket some variable until a
tie needs to be broken, the practice satisfies the strict definition. But the
practice falls outside the strict definition if a costly variable may be
added to the mix of relevant variables whenever it might affect the
outcome. The strict definition of a tiebreaker demands that a tie arise
before the tiebreaking decision rule comes into play.
B. Complications
As with many concepts, mine presents difficulties at the margins. A
couple of them are flagged in this section. The first complication is a
risk of underinclusion in the strict definition of a tiebreaker. The others
involve the possibility that the presence of a tiebreaker depends on the
observer’s frame of reference. My sense is that the first complication is
relatively minor, and that the others are either manageable or features
rather than bugs.
1. Functional equivalence.
Some decision procedures that include tiebreakers are functionally
equivalent to others that do not. To illustrate, compare (1) a majority
vote rule, with (2) a rule that awards victory to the side with more votes
plus a rule that motions fail on a tie vote. Only the second alternative
has the lexical ordering required by the strict definition of a tiebreaker,
yet both alternatives produce the same outcomes in all cases.24 If the
vote is, say, 50-50, the second decision procedure tells us that the motion
fails by resort to a tiebreaker in the strict sense, while the first decision
procedure tells us the same thing because the motion failed to achieve a
majority vote.25 And both are probably driven by the same purposes. It
23

See, for example, Ashwander v Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 US 288, 347 (1936)
(Brandeis concurring) (asserting that the Court’s practice was consistent with this norm).
This norm might also effectively skew the first-order decision rule, as when statutes are
interpreted to avoid the risk of a constitutional problem if reasonably possible. Such skewing
is akin to increasing the vote requirement for approval of legislation; it does not entail a
tiebreaking decision structure.
24
I am assuming the same quorum rule for both alternatives, and that the denominator
for the majority vote rule is the number of people actually voting.
25
See Robert, Robert’s Rules at 392 (cited in note 1) (“On a tie vote, a motion requiring
a majority vote for adoption is lost, since a tie is not a majority.”). The same observation can
be made for baseball. It is sometimes said that a “tie goes to the runner” at first base, but the
applicable rule states that a batter is out if “he or first base is tagged before he touches first
base.”
Official Baseball Rules 6.05(j) (2008) (emphasis added), online at
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seems as if the two alternatives should be treated together.
The functional equivalence problem is real but, in the end, not large.
In some cases, the purpose-based definition of a tiebreaker will capture a
functionally equivalent decision procedure. Majority vote rules are
candidates for this looser definition. More important, the functional
equivalence problem is confined by practical considerations. It is most
problematic when decisionmakers use a simple scoring system that
cleanly reduces all variables to one metric, such as group voting, but this
does not exhaust the phenomenon of indeterminacy. When more
subjective judgments must be made, such as the persuasiveness of
competing normative arguments, indeterminacy problems can be present
regardless of how convincing one side must be to prevail. In these
situations, it is not clear how adjusting the decision rule could mimic a
lexically inferior tiebreaker. If the tiebreaker would be “defendant wins
in cases of indeterminacy,” we cannot exactly match those results by
incremental increases in the plaintiff’s burden of persuasion. The
possibility of indeterminacy will reappear at each level.26
More generally, the content of many tiebreakers cannot be mimicked
without a bifurcated decision structure. For tiebreakers that introduce
new variables, such as flipping coins to resolve tie elections, there will
not be a plausible functional equivalent. No one will argue for adding a
randomly determined vote for one side or another in every election, and
doing so would still fail to provide functional equivalence. The results
would not be the same in every possible case. Adding a random vote to
every candidate election instead of reserving it for tiebreaking purposes
can cause tie votes, and then leave them unbroken. The same is true for
making the vice president a full voting member of the Senate, rather than
restricting his voting right to the case of a tie. As a full voting member,
the vice president might create ties when an odd number of senators
vote. The real differences between tiebreaking and other decision
structures are a principal concern of this article.
2. Framing the decision.
The strict definition of a tiebreaker requires lexically ordered rules
that address the same decision. These conditions were imposed to
prevent the definition from covering every bifurcated or sequential
decision structure. But there is no orthodox way to identify the relevant
“decision,” and so tiebreakers may disappear and reappear depending on
http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/downloads/y2008/official_rules/06_the_batter.pdf (visited Feb 6,
2010). Even if ties at first base are possible, this rule purports to offer a decisive resolution
without a separate tiebreaker.
26
However, requiring plaintiff to prove his case to an absolute certainty does seem to
mimic the comparable tiebreaking decision structure—that is, plaintiff must be certainly
correct, which will never or rarely occur, plus plaintiff loses if the decisionmaker is uncertain
whether plaintiff is certainly correct. The results should be the same in all cases.
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how an observer frames the decision in question.
Although the requirement of lexical ordering will stop the
uninhibited proliferation of perceived tiebreakers, many rules that look
like tiebreakers from one perspective can be eliminated by shrinking the
frame to excise any lexically superior decision rule. Isolating the task of
evaluating a single variable ignores the connection that variable might
have to any other. Radically small frames might be oddly small-minded,
but there is a related complication. Candidates for tiebreaker status
might be recharacterized as discrete rules applicable to particular
situations—as, in a sense, all rules are.
Take the yield-right rule for intersections. Traffic laws usually
provide that, when two vehicles “approach or enter an intersection from
different roadways at approximately the same time, the driver of the
vehicle on the left must yield the right-of-way to the vehicle on the
right.”27 Yield right can be counted as a tiebreaker for a rule that the
first driver to enter an intersection may proceed if safe to do so.28 That
is, a yield-right rule takes over when a first-in-time rule breaks down.
But one might instead say that there is one traffic rule for hotly contested
intersections and a separate rule for others.29 (One might even claim that
the first-in-time rule takes over when the yield-right rule breaks down,
although that perspective preserves lexical ordering.)
Framing decisions might be more art than science, but it is not so
problematic that an investigation into tiebreakers is fruitless. The
significance of such framing is hardly confined to tiebreakers,30 and it
does not appear that people are incapacitated by the possibilities for
reframing what seems like the relevant decision. Indeed a subdiscipline
of decision analysis is devoted to identifying discrete decision nodes
within the same decision tree and, at least incidentally, distinguishing
different decision trees.31 In any event, some decision structures are so
27

Ill Comp Stat Ann ch 625, § 5/11-901(a) (West 2009).
See Rupp v Keebler, 175 Ill App 619, 619 (1912) (stating the first-to-enter rule). See
also Lauman v Vandalia Bus Lines, Inc, 681 NE2d 1055, 1063–64 (Ill App Ct 1997)
(indicating that stop intersections may be governed by both rules).
29
See Edward C. Fisher and Robert H. Reeder, Vehicle Traffic Law 154–55 (1974)
(placing the yield-right rule into a category of right-of-way rules that deal with collision
risks). Compare Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 671–74
(Aspen 3d ed 2006) (summarizing the tiers of scrutiny in which different state classifications
trigger different burdens for defending them).
30
See, for example, Richard H. Fallon, Jr and Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, NonRetroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv L Rev 1731, 1758–1764 (1991)
(discussing when a judicial decision might qualify as new law rather than another part of the
old); Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 Yale L J 1311,
1313–18 (2002) (discussing potentially determinative framing issues in constitutional
adjudication); Daniel Lowenstein, Initiatives and the New Single Subject Rule, 1 Election L J
35, 46–48 (2002) (contending that a unitary subject is a contestable matter of convenience
and social context).
31
See Detlof von Winterfeldt and Ward Edwards, Designing a Decision Analytic
28
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plainly designed for the same problem that the presence of a tiebreaker
will be uncontroversial. That the yield-right rule might be challenging
for some observers to categorize should not explode the categories
entirely. There should be consensus that lotteries have been used as
tiebreakers to resolve candidate elections after a tolerable amount of
ballot counting fails to do so. And there should be consensus that the
penalty phase of a capital trial is not a tiebreaker for the guilt phase.
Even when there is not general agreement on an example, the
analysis that follows can be useful. If an individual is willing to
consider more than one variable within a frame and is personally
satisfied with the coherence of grouping two lexically ordered decision
rules together, the analysis may proceed along the lines suggested below.
In addition, the ability to accept large frames of reference permits the
critical evaluation of more decision structures. The last section of this
article exploits the possibility of large frames so as to evaluate all of law
or all of adjudication as a single unit resembling a tiebreaker. I hope to
show that this strikingly large frame is, if nothing else, provocative.
II. DESIGNING TIEBREAKERS
The foregoing discussion raises several questions. First, why would
someone design a decision procedure with a tiebreaker in the strict
sense? Every variable thought relevant to the merits of a decision can be
grouped into a single stage of evaluation, instead of stowing a variable in
a tiebreaker position. Second, if a tiebreaking decision structure is
justified, what should the tiebreaker look like? It must be that some
tiebreakers are better than others. This Part develops answers.
A. Justifying Tiebreaking Structures
Several justifications for a tiebreaking decision structure are
discussed below. Some of these arguments do not depend on a view that
ties are problematic per se, and some might be unpersuasive in any
event. Ultimately I will concentrate on plausible justifications that are in
fact related to the conclusion that ties must be minimized or eliminated.
1. Overloaded systems.
It turns out that the strict definition of a tiebreaker reaches not only
systems that experience episodic stalemates—such as candidate elections
and soccer matches—but also perpetually overloaded systems where
tiebreakers are constantly in use. In the latter case, decisionmakers are
so swamped with options that their ability to thoroughly evaluate each
Structure, in Ward Edwards, Ralph F. Miles, Jr, and Detlof von Winterfeldt, eds, Advances
in Decision Analysis: From Foundations to Applications 81, 94–96, 102 (Cambridge 2007)
(explaining that “a decision tree is not meant to be a complete and exhaustive representation
of all future decisions and events”).

15

one is overwhelmed. These onslaughts call for a decision procedure that
will take a first cut at the available choices and whittle them down to a
manageable set for more careful review. Here the motivation for a
tiebreaking decision structure is not exactly the fear that a decision rule
will run out, but rather that the system will be unable to make any sound
decisions at all.
In the early 1980s, for instance, the City of Minneapolis received
more than two thousand valid applications for only twenty firefighter
positions.32
Lacking the resources to thoroughly evaluate each
application, city officials randomly selected a subset of eight hundred
applicants for further competitive testing.33 An analogous decision
structure surrounds medical screening. Health professionals sometimes
use an inexpensive screening test to determine which patients are
relatively more likely to have an illness, and then use a more costly and
more accurate test to ferret out the false positives within the smaller
sample.34 We can understand the stages of civil litigation in similar
fashion. Civil actions that cannot be resolved by negotiation and
motions to dismiss are subject to more costly evaluative efforts, such as
summary judgment after discovery or, once in a while, full-blown trial.35
One might think that, during these stages of litigation, the decision rule
is not truly changing insofar as the substantive law remains stable. But
that view is superficial. More rigorous testing for only those judgments
that seem most difficult is a familiar strategy for economizing on
decision costs, and it is notoriously tricky to distinguish the effects of
changing “procedural” as opposed to “substantive” decision rules.36
A tiebreaking decision structure does emerge when an economical
screening device is joined with a more thorough backend evaluation on
the merits. There is lexical ordering and both decision rules seem to
address the same issue (hiring firefighters, for example, or determining
whether the defendant owes the plaintiff). But in these situations the
tiebreaking stages of the decision structure are the main events,
normatively speaking. The hiring example involves screening with a
random variable, which has no moral relevance to the issue. If
32

See Anderson v City of Minneapolis, 363 NW2d 886, 887 (Minn Ct App 1985).
See id (upholding the scheme).
34
See, for example, Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research,
Tuberculosis: Tests and Diagnosis (Jan 28, 2009) (discussing skin tests, blood tests, chest xrays,
gene
tests,
and
so
forth),
online
at
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/tuberculosis/DS00372/DSECTION=tests-and-diagnosis
(visited Feb 6, 2010)
35
See Fed R Civ P 12(b)(6), 12(c), 56 (authorizing dispositive pretrial motions). See
also 28 USC § 1914 (2006) (imposing filing fees for federal civil actions); Adam M. Samaha,
Litigant Sensitivity in First Amendment Law, 98 Nw U L Rev 1291, 1324, 1333–34 (2004)
(describing doctrine that filters out some claims and triggers further evaluation for others).
36
See, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 S Ct Rev
85, 112–13; Mark Tushnet, The Newer Property, 1975 S Ct Rev 261, 267–73.
33
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decisionmakers enjoyed unlimited resources, such screening rules would
probably fall away and what was heretofore a tiebreaker would become
the only decision rule. The tiebreaking decision structure is motivated
by decision cost constraints.
Screening devices for overloaded systems are worth treating
separately from tiebreakers that cure episodic stalemate. The system
overload scenario might be less controversial, in that a tiebreaking
decision structure is more likely necessary to avoid system crashes. If an
existing decision rule rarely produces ties, there is probably greater
opportunity to eliminate them without adding a lexically inferior
decision rule. More important, the tradeoffs will be different. With
overloaded systems, the design question is which options to screen out
given that excluded options cannot be reconsidered at the tiebreaking
stage. With episodic stalemates, the design question is which variable
should be used to break ties among plausible options, given a prior
robust effort to rank on the merits.
Overloaded systems are
meaningfully different and they will not be the focus of this Article.37
I do not want to overstate the differences. In both situations,
decisionmakers must select rules that move the system toward decision
without unduly jeopardizing the chance of a sound decision on the
merits. Whether the system is in crisis “at the front end” because too
many options are on the table, or “at the back end” because a leftover
subset of options seems indistinguishable, responsible decisionmakers
will address these possibilities. They will choose variables for one stage
of the decision procedure with a concern that errors might increase
during the other stage. The considerations discussed below are often
applicable to both overloaded systems and episodic stalemates, and to
situations in between.38
37

The overloaded system category could be excluded from the definition of a tiebreaker
by requiring that the lexically superior decision rule have some probability of resolving the
decision problem on its own. Aside from specification difficulties, this exclusion would
mean that the existence of a tiebreaker would depend on the composition of cases facing the
decisionmaker at any particular moment. Although it is not possible to entirely ignore the
composition of cases in evaluating the propriety of tiebreakers, I want to avoid complicating
the definition of a tiebreaker with this consideration.
38
One might think that a tiebreaking decision structure can be justified by the
desirability of decision-cost sequencing alone. As discussed above, see text accompanying
note 23, it can be sensible to postpone the evaluation of costly or controversial variables until
they become necessary to reach a sound decision. But decision-cost sequencing is often
accomplished without creating a tiebreaker in the strict sense. The costly or controversial
variable would have to be segregated from the other variables and considered only when
those variables are inconclusive—and not when those variables lean toward one option over
another, however slightly. For that lexical ordering to happen, an influence in addition to
decision costs is probably at work—such as system overload, moral inferiority, or the
imperative of breaking ties. The logic of decision-cost sequencing might help identify
variables that make good tiebreakers, but it does not justify a tiebreaking decision structure.
Similar comments apply to variables that are peculiarly subject to cognitively biased
evaluation. See generally Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under
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2. Morally inferior variables.
Another potential justification for a tiebreaking decision structure
results from moral reasoning and hierarchical value sets. Truly
fundamental values may take strong priority over others—so much so
that no amount of gain or loss measured on the inferior value set could
possibly alter a conclusion reached using the superior value set. If
anything within the superior value set points toward one option over
others, the decision is made. Note that neither incommensurability nor
incomparability is sufficient to create this rigid hierarchy of values.
Those concepts indicate difficulties in trading gains on one metric with
losses on another, but they do not indicate that any value is categorically
less important than others.39 To achieve a lexical value ordering, one or
more values must be drastically demoted into a fully inferior status.
Utilitarian purists might not accept that any two relevant values can,
will, or should be lexically ordered,40 but the idea has taken hold
elsewhere. The most famous example is probably John Rawls’s theory
of justice. Rawls described (1) a set of equal basic liberties, such as
freedom of thought, which takes priority over (2) a principle that social
and economic inequalities must be attached to positions that are
available under conditions of fair equality of opportunity, which in turn
takes priority over (3) a principle that such inequalities should afford the
greatest benefit to the least-advantaged person41—in other words, that
systems can be ranked according to how they treat the very least well-off
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in Judgment Under Uncertainty at 4–18 (cited in note
13). Such variables might be excluded from consideration in ordinary circumstances,
without making them tiebreakers. In addition, justifying a tiebreaking decision structure
based on the risk of cognitive bias might incorporate a self-defeating assumption. If a
decisionmaker will sometimes handle a particular variable poorly, there is reason to suspect
that the decisionmaker will sometimes not respect the dictates of a tiebreaking decision
structure.
39
See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 Mich L Rev 779,
796, 798 (1994) (explaining that incommensurability, in a relatively weak sense, “occurs
when the relevant goods cannot be aligned along a single metric without doing violence to
our considered judgments about how these goods are best characterized”); Jeremy Waldron,
Fake Incommensurability: A Response To Professor Schauer, 45 Hastings L J 813, 815–16
(1994) (distinguishing the dilemmas posed by strong incommensurability from ordering by
lexical priorities). On different specifications for the term, see, for example, Matthew Adler,
Law and Incommensurability, 146 U Pa L Rev 1169, 1383–86 (1998) (describing an
institutional form of incommensurability, in which the problem is not the actual
incomparability of different variables, but rather the inability of institutions to accurately
engage in such comparison), and Henry S. Mather, Law-Making and Incommensurability, 47
McGill L J 345, 348–58 (2002) (defining incommensurability as the “absence of rational
commensurability, either metrical or ordinal”).
40
But see John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism 11–16 (Chicago 1906) (asserting that certain
higher pleasures can safely be judged superior in kind by those with experience).
41
See John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 42–47, 59–61 (Belknap 2001)
(Erin Kelly, ed). Rawls also suggested that a principle of meeting “basic needs” might be
lexically prior to all three of the principles listed above in text. See id at 44 n 7.
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person.42 Evaluative frameworks such as this have a tiebreaking
structure insofar as lower priority grounds for judging systems come into
play only if higher priority grounds are satisfied. And this structure
comes about because of reflective moral reasoning, not because of any
aversion to ties per se.
Now, Rawlsian justice is not a perfect example of a tiebreaking
decision structure. The former establishes goals for justice seeking
societies, while the latter is a mechanism for avoiding stalemates within
society. A proponent of Rawlsian justice would want a system, indeed
all systems, to run the gauntlet of every priority listed above and to
satisfy every principle therein. Reaching the tiebreaking stage of a
decision structure, on the other hand, is commonly associated with a
sense of regret and a fear of calamity. Tiebreakers are often safeguards
in a way that lower priority principles in a Rawlsian scheme are not.
And when a tiebreaking decision structure is used to prevent system
overload, it has even less in common with the logic of hierarchical
values. Then tiebreakers are simply ensuring that decisions can be
made. Nevertheless, Rawlsian justice illustrates that sophisticated moral
reasoning can result in a conclusion that some values are categorically
more important than others. This conclusion can be the justification for
creating what qualifies as a tiebreaking decision structure, even if
Rawlsian justice does not quite have a tiebreaking character.
Although lexical moral inferiority is a relatively extreme judgment,
it is a phenomenon. A recent example to which I will return involves
student assignment. The City of Seattle guaranteed that siblings could
be sent to the same high school before factors such as racial composition
and geographic proximity were considered.43 As an extreme moral
judgment, lexical inferiority is subject to testing with extreme
hypotheticals. To be lexically inferior, the consideration must have zero
power to influence a result when a lexically superior consideration
points the other way, however slightly. Hence if a university claims that
42

See id at 59–60. A moderated version of Rawls’s third, maximin principle is leximin,
which allows comparison of the next-least well-off person if two options yield the same
treatment of the very least well-off person. See Amartya Sen, Choice, Welfare and
Measurement 24–25 (MIT 1982) (“[I]f the worst-off persons in two states are equally badly
off, then we compare the second worst-off persons, and so on.”). For other versions of
“prioritarianism” that incorporate some value for equality among people, including a weak
version where greater equality is merely a tiebreaker, see Bertil Tungodden, The Value of
Equality, 19 Econ & Phil 1, 23–32, tbl 2 (2003). A sophisticated review of prioritarian social
welfare functions and competitors can be found in Mathew D. Adler, Well-Being and Equity:
A Framework for Policy Analysis ch. 4 (Oxford, forthcoming 2011) (draft of January 2010,
on file with the author).
43
See text accompanying note 98 (discussing Parents Involved in Community Schools v
Seattle School District, 551 US 701 (2007)). Compare Norwest Bank Worthington v Ahlers,
485 US 197, 202 (1988) (describing the absolute priority rule in bankruptcy, under which
unsecured creditors may object to a reorganization plan that does not make them whole
before a junior class receives property).
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no student should be admitted unless the applicant is highly likely to
graduate, this must be true even when the applicant offers to donate a
hundred million dollars to the university and there is a 50-50 chance that
the applicant will graduate.
The larger problem with rigorous exploration of this justification for
tiebreakers is viewpoint diversity. Whether one consideration is
lexically inferior to a second consideration will depend on the
decisionmaker’s normative framework. Many frameworks exist—
cosmopolitan, libertarian, utilitarian, and so on—along with
disagreement over the proper application of general frameworks to
particular problems. Competing frameworks and contested applications
multiply the number of potential tiebreakers. This makes difficult a firm
judgment on any single tiebreaker without narrowing the analysis to one
moral perspective, and it makes impossible a firm judgment on many
tiebreakers at once without excessive length. My response is to show
how moral reasoning fits into a general analytic approach to the
evaluation of tiebreakers, without attempting to settle the specific moral
judgments that must be made within that analysis. In this way, the
analysis will remain relevant to people with a variety of moral
commitments, at the price of simple conclusions to narrow issues.
Before leaving moral reasoning, we can learn something by
comparing Rawlsian justice theories to decision theory literature
regarding uncertainty. Decision theorists attempting to maximize
expected utility have recognized special problems in rank ordering
possible actions when, for example, probabilities cannot rationally be
assigned to possible states of the world.44 Various strategies have been
suggested with nifty labels and more or less intuitive foundations:
maximin, maximax, minimax regret, the Hurwitz α-criterion, and so
on.45 These strategies could be thought of as tiebreakers, insofar as they
resolve indeterminacy and come into play when ordinary rules of
decision cannot solve the problem.46 Although it might well be better to
think of decision theorists as building two different strategies for two
different problems (risk versus uncertainty), the separate strategies
considered together vaguely resemble the lexically ranked priorities of
philosophers like Rawls.
There is another way to distinguish decision theory, however. The
goods that Rawls prioritizes do not seem to reappear in other parts of the
44

Literally speaking, probabilities always can be assigned. The question is whether
some assigned probabilities are basically worthless.
45
See French, Decision Theory at ch 2 (cited in note 6) (discussing these strategies).
Here “maximin” simply refers to the action with the highest lowest utility, rather than the
well-being of the least-advantaged person.
46
See Isaac Levi, Hard Choices: Decision Making Under Unresolved Conflict 110–11
(Cambridge 1986) (relating decision rules for situations of uncertainty to lexicographical
decision structures).
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ordering. Free thought might be necessary to make lower ranked goods
valuable, but that is not to say that free thought is part of the criteria at
those lower ranks. In some contrast, the values that animate strategies
for uncertainty, such as minimax regret—perhaps the special pain of
regret when a decisionmaker learns that he could have chosen a better
action—probably can be incorporated into expected utility analysis when
there is only risk. I know of nothing in decision theory that prohibits the
use of regret to estimate the utility associated with different outcomes in
different states of the world. These strategies might then allow for a
kind of “double counting”: the decisionmaker might take account of a
value such as regret aversion in every decision situation where regret is
possible and then, if uncertainty becomes a problem, reintroduce that
value to help rank one course of action over another. Regardless of the
present state of decision theory, the possibility of double counting
variables turns out to be important and I will raise it later on.47
3. Politics and strategic behavior
The discussion above emphasized moral principle. But decision
rules can be the product of politics, negotiation, compromise, and further
dynamic interaction among people with very different goals. These
dynamics can yield a tiebreaking decision structure. That is, people with
different interests might settle on a decision procedure that demotes
certain variables into a lexically inferior position, perhaps while finetuning the lexically superior rule to ensure that “ties” will happen with
some probability.
Something like this happened at the founding, when US House
delegations were given the task of selecting the president if no single
candidate received an outright majority of electoral votes.48 House
participation was expected to happen frequently enough that the
Electoral College would tend to function as a screening device rather
than the decisive stage of an election.49 A compromise explanation also
might help account for affirmative action programs that are designed as
tiebreakers rather than part of a unitary all-thing-considered judgment.50
Securitized debt instruments can portrayed in similar fashion, insofar as
different tranches are created with different risks and investors decide
whether and where to buy in.51 If things go badly, the stakes of those
who bought into less-favorable tranches are tapped out before those in
other tranches take losses. In any case, the general idea is that
47

See Part II.B.2.
See US Const Art II, § 1, cl 3.
49
See Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the
Constitution 265 (Knopf 1996).
50
See Part III.A.2.
51
See Kathleen C. Engel and Patricia A. McCoy, Turning A Blind Eye: Wall Street
Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 Fordham L Rev 2039, 2045–46 (2007).
48
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counterintuitive decision procedures are sometimes best explained and
even justified by interactive politics rather than abstract principle.
This leads to an observation about incentives and strategic behavior.
Tiebreakers are only effective when they differ from the lexically
superior decision rule, and the difference might matter to interested
parties. Knowing that the basis for decision will shift if the tiebreaker is
used, some people might be relieved to reach the tiebreaking stage while
others might seek to avoid it at all costs. Creating a tiebreaking decision
structure therefore opens another possibility for strategic behavior, by
parties and by decisionmakers. Thus one political party will not mind if
the Senate deadlocks and the vice president decides the matter, while
another will work harder to attract the fifty-first vote; and one
admissions officer might be satisfied with a large set of ties that allow
consideration of applicant income or race, while another might look
harder for distinguishing features relevant to the first cut.
Whether such adjustments are troublesome depends on a given
normative perspective. Perhaps competing pressures to avoid or prompt
a tiebreaker are unimportant, acceptable, or even useful. In any case, it
is difficult to offer a global evaluation of the strategic opportunities
generated by tiebreakers. More specific information is needed. For
instance, if the lexically superior decision rule is a variable such as age
or race, participants might not be able to manipulate the process into the
tiebreaking stage. The important observation is that a tiebreaking
decision structure, like any decision procedure, should be evaluated
considering the likely reaction of interested parties. The special point
about tiebreakers is that they may create unique strategic opportunities
and behavioral incentives.
4. Intolerable ties.
This brings us to justifications that depend on the threat of a tie,
which will be the focus of the remainder of the Article. But the first
thing to remember here is that a tie might be tolerable. In fact, ties are
sometimes required by law or moral theory.
Part of equal protection doctrine instructs officials to “treat like cases
alike.”52 Although this command is fairly vacuous, the objective is to
ensure that certain classes are treated the same as other classes with
respect to certain features. Functionally, this means that all remain tied
with respect to these features. In Reed v Reed,53 to take one example,
the Supreme Court invalidated the use of sex as a tiebreaker in
appointing the administrator of an estate. There might be other ways to
distinguish applicant qualifications, but fathers and mothers had to
52

See, for example, Engquist v Oregon Department of Agriculture, 128 S Ct 2146, 2153
(2008) (using this formulation); Vacco v Quill, 521 US 793, 799 (1997) (similar).
53
404 US 71, 76–77 (1971).
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remain “equally entitled”54 absent further inquiry. Perhaps the most
prominent legal equality norm is the one-person, one-vote principle for
legislative districting.55 At one point the Supreme Court went so far as
to claim that “[t]he conception of political equality from the Declaration
of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth,
Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing—
one person, one vote.”56
And it is a commonplace to tolerate parity in our social lives. Some
people like apples and oranges equally well, some people are agnostic
about the existence of a divine being, and some people try to treat each
of their children equally well. Many people believe that every person is
entitled to a certain kind of dignity and respect from others.57 Nothing in
these conclusions screams “error” and an urgent need for correction or
precaution. To the extent that a tie is a form of indeterminacy, only the
most pathologically curious among us find it impossible to rest with the
answer “I don’t know” or “It’s not clear.” The compulsion to rank order
is hardly a weaker sign of mental illness than the embrace of equality or
uncertainty. Even US News & World Report, which reflects widespread
craving for differentiation along a unitary numerical measure of quality,
tolerates ties when it ranks schools.58
Furthermore, life does not always present all-or-nothing choices.
Even when we face problems of scarcity—where not everyone’s
justified claim to a resource can be satisfied—there often will be
alternatives to ranking recipients and leaving some people out in the
cold. Sometimes the resource in question can be split between deserving
claimants without too much sacrifice in value. This is true of money. If
instead the resource is indivisible,59 there are other ways to share instead
54

Id at 73 (discussing the scheme under challenge).
See Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533, 568–77 (1964) (requiring legislative districts to
have “as nearly . . . equal population as is practicable”). See also US Const Art I, § 3, cl 2
(instructing that senators “be divided as equally as may be into three Classes” for election).
56
Gray v Sanders, 372 US 368, 381 (1963) (rejecting state districting scheme that gave
rural voters disproportionate influence over composition of legislature). Of course the
Court’s assertion fails to explain the composition of the United States Senate. See US Const
Art I, § 3, cl 2; & V.
57
See, for example, Immanuel Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue pt II, ch 1, sec II, § 38, at
255 (Mary Gregor trans, 1991) (1780) (positing a duty to respect others and a correlative
claim to respect); Universal Declaration of Human Rights art 1, 22, UN General Assembly
Res No 217A(III), UN Doc A/810 (1948) (declaring that “[a]ll human beings are born free
and equal in dignity and rights” and are “entitled to . . . rights indispensable for his dignity”).
See also Mill, Utilitarianism at 93 (cited in note 40) (formulating Jeremy Bentham’s view as
“‘everybody to count for one, and nobody for more than one.’”).
58
See US News & World Report, Best Colleges 2009, online at
http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/college/national-search (visited Feb 9, 2010)
(ranking both MIT and Stanford fourth).
59
I mean either literal or practical indivisibility. See Adam M. Samaha, Randomization
in Adjudication, 51 Wm & Mary L Rev 1, 20 (2009).
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of rank. Occasionally a resource can be used effectively by more than
one person at the same time. This is sometimes true of real property.
When this is not sensible, people might take turns using the resource,
thereby sharing across time. There is even the possibility of denying the
resource to equally entitled claimants.60 And it should be remembered
that some scarcity problems can be solved by producing more of the
resource. Finally, there are well-known benefits to delay. Indecision
creates an opportunity to collect more information and respond to
unforeseen circumstances. The obvious conclusion is that there is no
need to rank options when sustained equality is permitted, useful, or
required.
That said, ties certainly can be troublesome or even catastrophic.
The risks of ties prompt warnings of stalemate, standoff, impasse, or
deadlock. People will differ over which ties are disastrous and which are
endurable, but there is no question that individuals and societies are at
least occasionally justified in making extraordinary efforts to rank
options. The inability to select one home, one job, one patient, one
president, one plan of attack, or even one driver with the right of way
can be more than a nuisance. It can be the difference between systems
seizing up as opposed to rumbling forward. Indeed ties might be terrible
even when unlikely. If the potential injury from stalemate is sufficiently
catastrophic, even minuscule chances of a tie might be addressed with
extremely costly precautions.
As one remarkable illustration of the felt importance of breaking ties,
consider legislative redistricting in Illinois. The one-person, one-vote
principle triggers redistricting obligations every ten years when new
census figures arrive. But in the early 1960s, Illinois politicians
deadlocked over a new redistricting plan for the state house. As a
consequence, 236 candidates for 177 seats ended up all running together
in a single at-large race.61 The ballots were enormously long.
Subsequently, a new multitier tiebreaking system was established for
redistricting purposes.62 If the state legislature fails to complete a
redistricting plan by a certain deadline, a bipartisan eight-member
commission inherits the obligation. If this commission deadlocks as
well—which is not unlikely given its composition63—then lots are drawn
60

On a related note, the Order of the Coif used to allow its chapters to deny membership
to law students who tied for the last of a limited number of places. See Constitution of the
Order of the Coif § 4.2(b)(2) (1998). Committing to exclude tied candidates might create an
incentive to prevent ties in the first place by making a greater effort to rank all candidates,
rather than accepting less discriminating standards for the honor.
61
See James H. Andrews, Illinois’ At-Large Vote, 55 Natl Civic Rev 253, 253–54
(1966) (explaining that an at-large election was prescribed by the 1954 state constitution).
62
See Ill Const Art 4, § 3(b).
63
See John S. Jackson and Lourenke Prozesky, Redistricting in Illinois 9–11 (Paul
Simon
Public
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Institute,
Apr
2005),
online
at
http:100//opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1013&context=ppi_papers (visited
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to determine whether a Republican or Democrat is added to the
commission.64 The redistricting issue illustrates how the prospect of
deadlock may instigate repeated efforts to guarantee resolution, and to
improve the quality of the tiebreaking device.
B. When Ties Are Intolerable
Suppose, then, that a tie is costly or problematic. What is the best
response in terms of decision rules and decision structures? This section
first highlights design choices that can minimize ties without generating
tiebreaking decision structures, and then explains the advantages and
disadvantages associated with using tiebreakers, strictly defined.
1. Preventing ties.
If a persistent tie would be harmful, there are strategies for
responding to the risk aside from the creation of tiebreakers. The basic
lesson here is that the risk of a tie is a function of the decision rule
operating in a given context, and that there are several ways in which
decision procedures can be adjusted to prevent ties.
One possibility was mentioned above in a discussion of voting rules:
manipulating a unitary decision rule by raising the bar for one outcome
over another.65 That is, the preferred outcome can be predetermined for
numerical ties according to some value choice. As I have explained, this
move will not eliminate indeterminacy regarding whether the new bar
has been satisfied, but it can eliminate one form of tie.
Another possibility is to make a unitary decision rule more sensitive.
Greater effort to detect differences or better evaluative technology can
reduce the number of perceived ties. Hence a decisionmaker might
spend more time on the problem to gather information and to carefully
reconsider the options, or invest in better tools for processing relevant
information in ways that allow clearer distinctions between options.
These efforts can reveal more gradations within relevant metrics and can
yield greater confidence in these perceptions. This should reduce the
Feb 9, 2010) (noting deadlocks in each of the last three redistricting cycles).
64
See Winters v Illinois State Board of Elections, 197 F Supp 2d 1110, 1115 (ND Ill
2001) (three judge panel) (upholding the tiebreaker against due process and equal protection
challenges), summarily affirmed, 535 US 967 (2002). Proponents of this tiebreaking system
might have thought that the prospect of a lottery would frighten legislatures into reaching
agreement. This amounts to a “penalty default” tiebreaker, see Ian Ayres and Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99
Yale L J 87, 91–94 (1989), which is intended to encourage constructive behavior during the
prior stage of decisionmaking. The attempt has not been successful in Illinois redistricting,
but the strategy may be viable elsewhere. Difficulties include finding a tiebreaker that is
sufficiently unpleasant to affect behavior, yet not so awful that the threatened tiebreaker
could not credibly be threatened. In any event, seeing decisionmakers resort to tiebreakers
informs the rest of us that prior decision rules are failing to resolve issues. This might be
good reason to stop and reexamine the design of those prior rules.
65
See Part I.B.1 (discussing functional equivalents).
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probability of a tie. Thus radar guns supply a more accurate measure of
motorist speeds than unassisted human sensory perception; and we hope
that recounting ballots in candidate elections has a similar upside.
A related strategy is to make the decision rule more complex. If it
has not already been done, the scales for relevant variables could be
increased or new variables could be added. Assuming that every
gradation in the scale is equally likely to be perceived, and that variables
can be measured with adequate confidence, then the chance of a tie
plummets when we move from a variable with a few gradations to
hundreds or thousands of gradations. Adding new variables has a
similar effect. It tends to reduce the chance of a tie, all else equal.66
Moreover, adding variables might be justified regardless of how
threatening a tie would be. Every new variable that is relevant to a
sound decision should increase the likelihood of a correct decision,
taking into account the possibility that complex decision procedures tend
to induce mistakes.67
The reduction in ties from additional variables can be estimated.
Suppose you face two options: reading the rest of this Article (action A)
or writing an article of your own (action B). Suppose further that you
use two variables to resolve this type of decision problem: entertainment
value (variable a) and educational value (variable b). Each variable is
equally important to you and can take one of two values: favor action A
(represented by the value -1) or favor action B (represented by the value
+1).68 Assume that each value is equally likely for each variable in such
decisions before you begin thinking about your options.69 Finally,
variables a and b are commensurable; you will simply add them together
66

One factor that must remain unaffected is the distribution of hard cases. If for some
reason the addition of another variable leads people to litigate hard cases more often, for
example, then the percent chance of a tie might actually increase. Having no strong intuition
about the effect on contested cases, I will assume no net effect.
67
See, for example, Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of
Contract, 47 Stan L Rev 211, 214 (1995) (noting that the search for each relevant variable
imposes costs upon the decisionmaker), citing James G. March and Herbert A. Simon,
Organizations 171 (Wiley 1958).
68
These relative values make it easy to see the direction in which each variable points in
two-option cases. A more common scoring method assigns a zero or positive value {0, 1, 2,
. . . n} to each variable for each option (for example, Aa = 1, Ab = 2, Ba = 3, Bb = 2, Ca = 2,
Cb = 0), and then compares the total scores for each option (for example, A = 3, B = 5,
C = 2).
69
The convention in decision theory differs. Ordinarily, decision theorists construct
their decision tables to show that the expected utility of different options depends partly on
the state of the world after a decision is made, and that the possible states are beyond the
decisionmaker’s control. Hence decision tables chart the consequences of a set of actions
across a set of states, which might or might not be subject to reliable prediction. See, for
example, French, Decision Theory at 33 (cited in note 6). In my simplified discussion, the
exact consequences of action A and action B are known to the decisionmaker once values are
assigned to the variables, and it is known that each variable is equally likely to take the value
-1 or +1.
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to make the decision. On these assumptions, the probability of a tie is
50 percent. There are four permutations and two of them add up to zero,
as shown in Table 1. A zero sum amounts to a tie between A and B.
Table 1: Permutations for 2 variables with 2 values {-1, +1}
a
b
a+b
choice
-1
-1
-2
A
+1
-1
0
tie
-1
+1
0
tie
+1
+1
+2
B

Now suppose that you are willing to add a third variable to the mix,
such as reputation (variable c). If c has the same characteristics as a and
b, the possibility of a tie is totally eliminated. All three variables can
never add up to zero, given the restrictions on their values. The eight
permutations are shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Permutations for 3 variables with 2 values {-1, +1}
a
b
c
a+b+c
choice
-1
-1
-1
-3
A
+1
-1
-1
-1
A
-1
+1
-1
-1
A
+1
+1
-1
+1
B
-1
-1
+1
-1
A
+1
-1
+1
+1
B
-1
+1
+1
+1
B
+1
+1
+1
+3
B

These two-value cases do not reflect most real-life decision
problems. Many variables are much less rigid. One variable might be
more important than others, or might clearly favor one action over
another rather than simply point in one direction. As a corrective, one or
more variables can be loosened to take values higher than +1 or lower
than -1. It is also possible for a variable to be indeterminate. A
decisionmaker might be unable to distinguish two actions with respect to
educational value, or entertainment value, or some other relevant feature.
This possibility suggests that at least some variables should be adjusted
so that they may take the value 0.
The two-value variable cases lack these nuances. Because of this, an
odd pattern emerges for the chance of a tie when new variables are
added (Figure 1). The chance of a tie is always nil with an odd number
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of variables taking the values {-1, +1}. In contrast, an even number of
such variables results in a diminishing number of ties, with the percent
chance topping out at 50 percent in the two-variable case.

The second pattern is the one worth stressing: the percentage of
ties tends to decrease as the number of variables increases. It holds
for more nuanced variables. For variables taking the values {-1, 0,
+1}, the chance of a tie stays at 33 percent for one or two variables
and then drops to about 26 percent for three variables and 18 percent
for seven variables (Figure 2). The pattern is similar for variables
taking the values {-2, -1, 0, +1, +2}. The major difference is that the
chance of a tie is uniformly lower, starting at 20 percent and falling to
about 10 percent with seven variables in play (Figure 3).70
2. Breaking ties.
The results above reflect a general principle that additional
70
In the case of seven five-value variables, there are 78,125 permutations (57). I thank
Daniel Roberts for his help in constructing these tables of permutations. The relevant
spreadsheets are available from the author upon request.
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gradations or variables tend to reduce the risk of a tie. If a tie would be
problematic, the best response might be a unitary decision rule that
incorporates every conceivably relevant variable and a decision
procedure that measures each variable with precision. But there are
limits to the foregoing strategy. Decision costs likely will rise as the
decision rule encompasses more variables and the process becomes more
sensitive to nuance. In addition, the number of variables truly relevant
to a sound decision has a ceiling. At some point rational decisionmakers
will run out of them. Moreover, the ceiling on useful variables might be
lower if we account for the limited cognitive capacity of human beings.
Complex formulas will be beyond the ability of many people to operate,
at least without making frequent and serious errors. And, in at least
some situations, a tie will remain possible even if all relevant variables
are measured without error. For these reasons, it will sometimes make
sense to create a tiebreaking decision structure to break intolerable ties.
So what makes a good tiebreaker? Three candidates are assessed
below: random, relevant, and double-counted variables.
a) Randomization. Aside from morally inferior variables, and as a
purely theoretical matter, there is an especially attractive type of tiebreaker:
randomization. A great virtue of randomization is that it facilitates decisive
resolution while accepting that reason can run out.71 Randomization allows
a decisionmaker to embrace any form of indeterminacy without suffering a
destructive stalemate and without ignoring or distorting the value of any
variable relevant to the merits. Decisions do not tend to improve when a
random variable is thrown into the mix of relevant variables, and so a
decisionmaker is probably not missing anything when she first tries to solve
a problem on the merits without randomization. A random variable located
in the tiebreaker position, however, can resolve major headaches.

Hence if two actions are mutually exclusive yet equally preferable,
the decisionmaker can give each action equal chances. In doing so, she
avoids distorting her evaluation of the situation to meet the imperative of
judgment, the infiltration of improper grounds for decision, and the
unrealistic belief that reason can rank everything.72 Randomization
suppresses no ties, yet it resolves them. Turning to a statistically
equiprobable randomization device is not the only rational response to
indeterminacy; the decisionmaker could use any method for picking one
action over another that is arbitrary,73 in the sense of operating on a
71

See Elster, Solomonic Judgements at 38, 54, 73, 75, 107–09 (cited in note 6);
Samaha, Randomization at 21–22 (cited in note 59). See also Peter Stone, The Luck of the
Draw (forthcoming 2010).
72
See Otto Neurath, The Lost Wanderers of Descartes and the Auxiliary Motive, in Otto
Neurath, Philosophical Papers: 1913–1946 1, 8 (D. Reidel 1983) (Robert S. Cohen and Marie
Neurath trans, eds) (“Rationalism sees its chief triumph in the clear recognition of the limits
of actual insight.”).
73
See Edna Ullmann-Margalit and Sidney Morgenbesser, Picking and Choosing, 44 Soc
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principle orthogonal to the merits. But whether the randomizing device
is statistical or orthogonal,74 it nonetheless provides a useful and rational
response to indeterminacy.
As a matter of practical reality, however, randomization often will be
unavailable. Occasionally the hindrance will be sadly pedestrian.
Consider the yield-right rule. It obviously works much better than
drivers flipping coins, which entails delay and coordination problems.
Probably more often, the hindrance will be cultural or political. This
resistance seems strongest with respect to adjudication on the merits,
where judges face not only reversal but also professional discipline if
they flip coins to decide cases.75 Of course, randomization is accepted
practice elsewhere, including case assignment lotteries within
judiciaries.76 But lotteries can be a politically explosive decision rule.
Officials who resort to them risk “the reproach of frivolity or
cynicism.”77
A recent illustration comes from Connecticut election law. That
state’s statutes used to provide that tied primary elections would be
resolved by lot.78 For at least fifty years preceding the 2006 election
cycle, there had been no ties in any Connecticut election and so the
provision rested in quiet obscurity. In that year, an incumbent state
legislator attracted a primary challenger and the ballot-counting
procedure ended with each candidate receiving 457 votes. The
incumbent prevailed on a coin toss. When she returned to the
legislature, she and the Secretary of the State joined forces to amend the
statute. “No candidate should have to worry that a tie would mean a
coin-flip,” the Secretary later declared, “and more importantly no voter

Res 757, 758–65, 773–74 (1977) (distinguishing “picking” from “choosing” based on
preferences and reasons).
74
See Samaha, Randomization at 10–14 (cited in note 59) (distinguishing these
concepts).
75
See, for example, In re Brown, 662 NW2d 733 (Mich 2003) (censuring judge who
used coin flip to determine a custody dispute); Annual Report of the New York State
Commission on Judicial Conduct 84, 88 (1984); In re Friess, 91 AD2d 554, 554–56.
76
See Neil Duxbury, Random Justice: On Lotteries and Legal Decision-Making 43–84
(Oxford 1999) (collecting examples of lotteries in social decisions); Samaha, Randomization
at 29–53 (cited in note 59) (contrasting attitudes toward randomization in case assignment
and merits judgments).
77
Neurath, The Lost Wanderers of Descartes at 9 (cited in note 72) (asserting that the
populace would compare such a politician unfavorably to the statesmen of the past). See also
Elster, Solomonic Judgements at 37 (“Rather than accept the limits of reason, we prefer the
rituals of reason.”); John E. Coons, Consistency, 75 Cal L Rev 59, 110 (1987) (similar);
Judith Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 Cornell L Rev 603, 611 (1985) (“[T]he community
wishes judicial rulings to appear to be the product of contemplative, deliberative, cognitive
processes.”).
78
See 2007 Conn Pub Act No 07-194, § 46 (showing and amending the previous
version of the statute).
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should fear being disenfranchised.”79 However weak this logic might be,
Connecticut law now mandates special elections instead of lotteries to
resolve ties in primary elections.80 The financial cost of a special
election is a rough indication of the political difficulty with
randomization in this particular context.
b) Relevant variables.
If randomization is unavailable, an
alternative is to place a relevant variable in the tiebreaker position. Often
this will be regrettable. To the extent that a variable relevant to the merits
of a decision is isolated from consideration unless and until the other
relevant variables cancel out, the decisionmaker is throwing out potentially
valuable information. Not every feasible system is first-best, however, and
informational sacrifices might have to be made. The discussion here offers
a way to think about the tradeoffs.

Begin by noticing an obscure benefit from using a relevant variable
as a tiebreaker instead of adding it to the mix of other variables. As
shown in Part II.B.1, adding a variable to a decision rule tends to drive
down the chance of a tie—but placing that same variable in a lexically
inferior position tends to drive down the chance of a tie even faster. The
same variable will usually do more good against ties as a tiebreaker then
it will when treated like any other relevant variable. Although I am not
aware of a mathematical proof for this proposition, it holds for many
situations.
Figures 4 through 7 display some results.81 In each figure, one line
charts the drop in ties when a variable is added to the mix of other
variables, while a second line charts the drop when a variable is instead
made the tiebreaker for the remaining variables. Figure 4 shows results
for binary variables that can only take the values {-1, +1}. Here the
79
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candidate finished close behind the other two, making salient the thought that voters’
opinions had been disregarded.
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See Conn Gen Stat § 9-446(a)–(b). Randomization is not gone from the system. If
the special primary election ends in another tie, lots are drawn. See id.
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Calculating the percent chance of a tie with only one tiebreaker variable is simple,
once the permutations are set out for the other variables. The formula is the chance of a tie
with the tiebreaker variable alone (for example, 0.2 for a variable with equal chances of
taking one of the five values {-2, -1, 0, +1, +2}) multiplied by the chance of a tie with the
other variables and no tiebreaker.
As in Part II.B.1, I am making the important assumption that the probability of each
variable taking the value zero is just as likely as that variable taking any other value in the set
of permissible values. In the real world, these probabilities might be very different and
sometimes they will not be known. The examples discussed in the text are instructive
illustrations rather than close approximations of real-life decisionmaking.
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chance of a tie is always zero when one of these variables is a tiebreaker.
The dramatic quality of this effect is moderated, however, because the
chance of a tie is also zero in half the cases when such binary variables
are all mixed together. Depending on the number of binary variables, a
tiebreaker might not be necessary.

The results are more consistent for other types of variables. Figure 5
uses variables that may point in one of two directions but also may
themselves be indeterminate—that is, they take the values {-1, 0, +1}.
Here the chance of a tie is never eliminated, but it is systematically
lower when one of these variables is saved for the tiebreaking role. For
example, if two such variables are relevant to the merits, the chance of a
tie is about 33 percent when the variables are added together but only
about 11 percent when one variable is reserved as a tiebreaker. With
seven such variables, the difference is 18 percent compared to under
7 percent. Figure 6 shows the five-value variable cases, where each
variable may point strongly or weakly in one of two directions and may
also be indeterminate. The results are similar, although the chance of a
tie is lower across the board.
Not all variables have the same character within the same decision
situation. Figure 7 illustrates one version of variable diversity. It
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combines some number of variables taking the values {-2, -1, 0, +1, +2}
with one dummy variable taking the value {-1, +1}. Reserving this
dummy variable for tiebreaking purposes eliminates all ties. This
variable can only point in one direction or another, making it decisive in
all cases where it is the only consideration. The figure confirms that
adding more five-value variables to the mix also reduces the chance of a
tie, albeit more slowly. Mixing seven of these variables still leaves the
chance of a tie at nearly 11 percent. Hence this combination of variable
types follows the general pattern established above, with more extreme
benefits from the tiebreaker.
There is a downside, of course. Each of these decision structures
entails a decisionmaker ignoring information by secluding relevant
variables into tiebreaker positions. Segregating relevant information is
not risk-free. If a relevant variable is used as a tiebreaker, the decision
will be clearly free of error only when (1) the tiebreaker variable is itself
indeterminate, in which case it is unhelpful to the decisionmaker
regardless of the decision structure, or (2) the non-tiebreaker variables
yield indeterminacy, in which case the tiebreaker will be considered and
no relevant information will be discarded. In all other cases, there will
be something wrong with the result.
A serious concern is the risk of a missed reversal. In a number of
instances, the tiebreaking variable would have pointed strongly enough
in one direction to overcome a weak preference for another direction
based on the other variables. This risk can be calculated. With respect
to variables with an equal likelihood of taking one of the five values {-2,
-1, 0, +1, +2}, the risk of missing a reversal by using a tiebreaker ranges
from 8 percent for two such variables to a little over 4 percent for seven
such variables.82 The need for a tiebreaker of this kind should exceed
the costs associated with choices that are outright incorrect on occasion.
A second concern is the risk of missed ties. Even if adding a
tiebreaker variable into the mix would not have shifted the
decisionmaker’s choice from one action to another, this variable might
have generated a tie had it been mixed up front. Again taking the fivevalue variable cases as illustrative, the isolation of one variable in the
tiebreaker position misses a tie in 16 percent of the permutations for two
such variables and a bit over 8 percent of the permutations for seven
such variables. Of course, this risk is also a benefit insofar as ties are
problems; the tiebreaking structure is avoiding stalemate in a fraction of
82
To reiterate, this calculation does not include cases where the non-tiebreaker variables
total up to zero; in those cases, the tiebreaker variable would have been considered anyway.
Instead, the missed reversal rate was calculated by counting the number of times the
tiebreaker variable took the value -2 or +2 when the non-tiebreaker variables added up to +1
or -1 (respectively), and then dividing by the total number of permutations with all variables
taken together. Given the restrictions on the variables, this calculation covers every case in
which the tiebreaker variable is strong enough to reverse a decision.
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all cases.83 Nevertheless, the best answer based on all relevant
information can be indeterminate. Saving a relevant variable for
tiebreaking purposes will artificially suppress a number of true ties.
A third cost is incorrect magnitudes. Sometimes it is valuable to
know not only which action is superior but also the degree to which that
action is better than others. Placing a relevant variable in a tiebreaker
position can interfere with such judgments of magnitude, even if that
variable would have neither reversed the decision nor generated a tie.
The tiebreaker variable might have nudged the decisionmaker even
further toward one action, or back toward some other action. Returning
to the five-value variable cases, a tiebreaking decision structure usually
results in an inaccurate magnitude assessment. For two or three such
variables, there would have been a magnitude change 64 percent of the
time by including the tiebreaker variable with the non-tiebreaker
variables; this number increases to 71 percent for seven such variables.84

Figure 8 charts these three kinds of errors for the five-value variable
cases. Figure 9 does so for five-value variables combined with one
dummy variable taking the value {-1, +1}. Notice that in this last set of
cases, the missed reversal rate falls to 0 percent. This is the consequence
of using such a weak dummy variable as a tiebreaker instead of a
variable with greater nuance. When a variable only and always points
toward one action or another, and when that variable can only weakly
favor one action over another, then it can only alter magnitudes or create
ties when mixed with the five-value variables—given their character.
And, of course, a dummy variable will break ties resulting from the other
variables 100 percent of the time.
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However, recall that throwing another relevant variable into the mix also reduces the
chance of a tie, so using a tiebreaker has mixed effects on the number of ties.
84
I again exclude cases where the non-tiebreaker variables add up to zero.
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c) Double counting. Because using a relevant variable as a
tiebreaker is a double-edged sword, there should be a desire for less
tragic alternatives. If randomization is still unavailable, might there be a
way to use relevant variables without throwing out useful information?
Double counting seems to be the answer.
The discussion above assumed that a relevant variable could be
placed either in a lexically superior decision rule or in a lexically inferior
decision rule, not both. But a variable can be made part of both stages.
Decisionmakers could consider variables a, b, and c during their first cut
at a decision problem, and then break any resulting ties by considering
variable a once again. No valuable information is lost at stage one. In
this respect, double counting a relevant variable to break ties is like
using a random variable: neither requires the decisionmaker to ignore
any relevant consideration at the first stage of the decision procedure.
Meanwhile, reintroducing a concededly relevant variable to resolve close
calls might avoid the stigma sometimes associated with randomization.
However, double counting comes with a potential drawback that is
not present with random tiebreakers. Including a variable in both
decision rules might make that consideration unduly important to
interested parties.
It might create incentives to excel on that
dimension—or to select into an applicant pool—that are too strong from
a given normative baseline. Thus if an author knows that readers
evaluating her article will use variable a as part of a first stage judgment
that might be decisive and also to resolve any lingering doubts about its
ranking, she might put more effort into writing an amusing article than
decisionmakers would otherwise prefer. Random tiebreakers do not
have this influence on behavior.85
Problematic incentive effects from double counting can be addressed
by reducing the weight of variable a, but this will come with error costs.
If variable a receives less weight within the lexically superior decision
rule to compensate for its reappearance in the tiebreaker position, then
presumably some first stage decisions will be skewed. There can be
missed reversals, missed ties, and incorrect magnitude estimates because
the weight of variable a has been depressed. Similar remarks apply even
when variable a ought to be more influential than other considerations,
as an independent normative matter. It is true that reintroducing variable
a as the tiebreaker is one way to increase its influence. But this
reintroduction will not affect decisions that never reach the tiebreaking
stage. To influence those decisions, variable a must also receive greater
weight within the lexically superior decision rule—and this reintroduces
the incentives problem with which we began.86
85
Random variables might have other problematic behavioral consequences, depending
on how people react to unpredictability associated with randomization.
86
As Lee Fennell has suggested to me, decisionmakers could break ties by randomizing
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Nevertheless, double counting will at least occasionally be the best
available tiebreaker. Its desirability depends on a comparison of the
error costs and incentive effects within a particular context. Under
certain conditions, a variable relevant to a decision on the merits will
have little effect on behavior. One such variable is chronological age,
which is an attribute that people cannot change. Although double
counting an immutable and easily verified characteristic will sometimes
change the mix of applicants for a benefit, it will break ties, it will not
increase errors at the decisionmaking stage, and it will minimize
potentially troublesome incentive effects.
Examples of double counting to break ties do exist. In the 1990s, the
United States Air Force evaluated new weapons systems with a
procedure that included double counting. Officials first screened
defense contractor proposals for effectiveness, then evaluated the
remaining alternatives based on a more detailed investigation of both
effectiveness and cost.87 In 2006, the University of California, Berkeley
announced an admissions policy with an analogous structure. According
to the policy, all applications would be scored for strength and some
applicants would be awarded admission at this stage. But for an
anticipated “tie-break pool,” experienced evaluators would reread those
applications according to “the same array of criteria” used in the first
stage plus additional considerations, such as whether the applicant
attended a low performing public school.88 In both examples, variables
appear and reappear.
Because these examples involve screening, however, they are not
within my core concern. At the end the decision process, several
variables are in play to resolve a predictably high number of ties.
Moreover, the first stage of evaluation might represent priorities that are
not so much double counted as they are minimum standards. But other
instances of double counting for tiebreaking purposes surely exist—or
they ought to.89
across the relevant variables in the lexically superior decision rule. If this lottery of relevant
variables is weighted in accord with the relative importance of each variable within the
lexically superior decision rule, then it should avoid the error costs and could avoid the
incentive problems that I have raised. Such lotteries can be useful but they conflict with an
assumption of the discussion above—namely, that randomization is not feasible. Whether
weighted or unweighted, lotteries often face practical implementation problems. See text
accompanying note 74.
87
See Zachary F. Lansdowne, Ordinal Ranking Methods for Multicriterion Decision
Making, 43 Naval Res Logistics 613, 613–14 (1996)
88
Admissions, Enrollment and Preparatory Education Committee, the University of
California, Berkeley, Tie-Breaking Procedures: Freshman Selection Fall 2007 and Spring
2008
(Nov
17,
2006),
online
at
http://academicsenate.berkeley.edu/committees/pdf_docs_consolidate/Freshman_Tie_Break_Appvd_607.pdf (visited Feb 9, 2010).
89
Part III.B.2 considers whether various presumptions in law sometimes operate as
double counted variables even if they are not formally designed as tiebreakers at all.
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***
The foregoing analysis indicates features that a desirable tiebreaker
should have. The best tiebreakers will minimize errors while providing
a decisive resolution when other considerations end in stalemate.
Obviously the optimal tiebreaker for a given decision situation will vary
according to one’s preferred goals and values, including the relative
importance of different kinds of errors. But we have learned enough to
outline the profile of an attractive tiebreaker, even when randomization
is foreclosed.
First, if a relevant variable must be sacrificed to the tiebreaker
position, it should be a relatively unimportant consideration. Categorical
moral inferiority is obviously one form of relative unimportance. But
this feature was also suggested above by variables that could not take
values less than -1 or greater than +1. The conclusion is an extension of
the case for lotteries as tiebreakers. Choosing a relatively less important
variable reduces the number of missed reversals, missed ties, and
inaccurate magnitude estimations. At the extreme limit, with a random
variable or truly orthogonal consideration, decisionmakers will not lose
any relevant information and they are unlikely to skew behavioral
incentives in undesired directions. There may well be political
hindrances to using nearly frivolous considerations to resolve stalemate,
as there sometimes are with lotteries. People might be disturbed when
the decisive consideration in an important matter is so trivial. But, if
decisionmakers can get away with it, frivolousness is a virtue for
tiebreakers in the context of episodic stalemate.
Second, an especially good tiebreaker will be decisive. The
discussion above presupposes that ties are problematic, and so the best
tiebreakers have the best chance of breaking all ties. A variable that will
always and clearly identify one and only one action should be preferred,
all else equal. This feature was signified above by variables that could
not take the value zero. Although affected parties can alter their
behavior in light of a predictably unidirectional tiebreaker, sometimes
these incentives will be not terribly problematic and in any event
unimportant compared to the value of nearly automatic resolution of
socially destructive stalemates.
Third, variables that are controversial or otherwise costly to assess
might be good candidates for tiebreakers. This observation is partly in
tension with the value of decisive tiebreakers, but in some circumstances
it will be best to confine a difficult consideration to a tiebreaker position.
Tiebreaker variables will not be considered very often if ties are rare.
Decisionmakers can then take advantage of a bifurcated decision
structure to minimize evaluation of the most taxing variables. Of course,
if such variables are so difficult to assess that the decisionmaker risks
falling into another tie, there will be a sacrifice in decisiveness. And if
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such variables are also relatively important to a sound judgment,
restricting them to a tiebreaker position can result in high error costs—
partly because valuable information is often lost, partly because practice
might make perfect in a decisionmaker’s ability to assess these variables.
Theoretically, however, costly variables can be too difficult to handle on
a consistent basis and hence potentially good tiebreakers.90
Fourth and finally, a relevant variable need not always be sacrificed
to the tiebreaker position alone. Sometimes it will be appropriate to
double count a variable that was included in the lexically superior
decision rule. Such double counting comes with the risk of undesirable
incentive effects or, in the alternative, error costs. But double counting
may outperform the isolation of a relevant variable into a tiebreaker
position.
III. APPLICATIONS
With the forgoing lessons in mind, we are in better position to
evaluate design choices related to tiebreakers. In some cases, the task of
evaluation is fairly simple. Consider the yield-right rule. Assuming it
qualifies as a tiebreaker, it seems like a good one. First, it uses a
variable with admirable unimportance. Nobody believes that yielding
right or left at an intersection has moral significance.91 Moreover,
nothing important is lost in traffic law by imposing a yield-right rule
only when motorists are effectively tied with respect to the time at which
they reach an intersection. Further extending a preference for traffic
coming from any motorist’s right would delay many vehicles for no
good reason.92 Equally notable, the variable is remarkably easy for
drivers to ascertain and it is cleanly decisive.93
90
In fact, if errors are not distributed in a troublesome way, then especially difficult
variables might be rough substitutes for random tiebreakers.
91
Perhaps an explanation for our yield-right preference is the longstanding rule for ships
at sea. See Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Oct
20, 1972, Rule 15; The Chesapeake, 5 F Cas 560, 560 (CCNY 1867) (discussing the “simple
and plain” rule). Captains’ quarters were ordinarily built on the starboard side, meaning that
a captain in his quarters with a window would ordinarily be able to see a ship coming from
his ship’s “right.” But in the United States, automobile drivers are situated on the left side of
their vehicles. On the other hand, there are less arbitrary explanations for the yield-right rule
for ground traffic. Where traffic must stay on the right side of the road, the vehicle to the
right will more quickly pass the line of crossing if both vehicles enter the intersection at the
same time and travel at the same speed. See Salmon v Wilson, 227 Ill App 286, 288 (Ill App
Ct 1923) (noting that this principle is merely a presumption and could not be applied in all
cases, including the one at bar). So perhaps yield right is a logical extension of a first-in-time
principle.
92
See Partridge v Enterprise Transfer Co, 30 NE2d 947, 952 (Ill App Ct 1940)
(upholding a verdict for motorist involved in collision after entering an intersection from the
left prior to the car with which he collided).
93
There are exceptions. When four motorists traveling from different directions reach a
four-way intersection at approximately the same time, the yield-right rule itself breaks down
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In this Part, three more important subjects are investigated in greater
depth. These applications illustrate themes from the discussion above.
The first application highlights the difficulties of lexical ordering. It
assesses affirmative action programs, which are occasionally designed as
tiebreakers even though this decision structure might not make sense as a
matter of first principle. The second application shows the legal system
responding to intolerable ties.
It examines tiebreakers within
interpretive method, which judges use to avoid indeterminacy in legal
texts. The third application picks up on the possibility of effectively
randomizing or double counting relevant variables. It involves all of
adjudication, maybe all of law. The question here is whether
adjudication writ large might be a tiebreaker for a set of disputes in the
rest of social life and, if it is, how we might judge the character of that
institution.
A. Affirmative Action
Affirmative action can serve more than one goal and it can take more
than one form. Even so, a significant strand of the affirmative action
idea involves conscious efforts to increase the representation or enhance
the status of people who share some characteristic, such as a particular
race or sex.94 The straightforward way to accomplish these goals is
conscious consideration of the characteristic of interest by
decisionmakers who have power to change the situation of concern.
Characteristics such as race or sex (or income or legacy status or
whatever) can be incorporated into decision procedures as a relevant
variable. Although many people totally oppose the consideration of such
factors in some subset of decisions, my concern here is the best design
for affirmative action programs where the characteristic in question
might lawfully be taken into account.
1. Options.
Among the significant design choices for such programs is whether
to use a tiebreaking decision structure. Two recent Supreme Court
decisions illustrate quite different designs.
and someone needs to barge ahead or be waived ahead.
94
See, for example, Cecil J. Hunt II, The Color of Perspective: Affirmative Action and
the Constitutional Rhetoric of White Innocence, 11 Mich J Race & L 477, 517 (2006)
(relating several definitions of affirmative action to “an explicit consciousness of race and
some degree of preference based on perceived racial identity”); Roberta Ann Johnson,
Affirmative Action Policy in the United States: Its Impact on Women, 18 Pol & Politics 77,
77 (1990) (defining affirmative action to include programs that “take some kind of initiative
. . . to increase, maintain or rearrange the number or status of certain group members usually
defined by race or gender, within a larger group”); James P. Sterba, A Definition of
Affirmative Action, in Carl Cohen and James P. Sterba, Affirmative Action and Racial
Preference: A Debate 199, 200 (Oxford 2003) (defining affirmative action policies partly in
terms of “favoring qualified women and minority candidates over qualified men or
nonminority candidates”).
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Grutter v Bollinger95 reviewed an affirmative action program for
admissions that lacked a tiebreaker. University of Michigan Law School
officials used race as one factor among many in evaluating prospective
students.96 That an applicant’s race was mixed together with a range of
other considerations became a theme in the Court’s rationale for
upholding the program against an equal protection challenge. The
majority was satisfied with this kind of all-things-considered
individualized assessment for an institution of higher education that
wanted to remain academically excellent and, at the same time, at least
somewhat racially diverse.97
In contrast, Parents Involved in Community Schools v Seattle School
District98 reviewed a race conscious program with a tiebreaker. One of
the programs in question assigned students to Seattle’s public high
schools.
School officials collected parental preferences for the
placement of incoming ninth graders. For oversubscribed schools, the
program allowed siblings to stay together, then considered the racial
composition of the school’s entire student body, and then considered
geographic proximity of the school to the applicant’s home.99 In the rare
case that geography did not assign all remaining applicants, a lottery was
used.100 This time the Court invalidated the program against an equal
protection challenge, at one point emphasizing the program’s limited
effects on school racial composition.101
95

539 US 306 (2003).
See id at 315–16.
97
See id at 334–44. But compare Gratz v Bollinger, 539 US 244 (2003) (invalidating a
university admissions program that gave a set number of points to race minority applicants).
98
551 US 701 (2007).
99
See id at 711–13; id at 813 (Breyer dissenting) (noting that the plan did not apply to
transfer students). Seattle’s assignment plan did not mandate a particular racial composition
for each school, but it did define relatively homogenous compositions judged by
white/nonwhite populations and then attempted to moderate those extremes. See id at 712.
Whether such programs count as “affirmative action” is debatable. I use them to illustrate a
decision structure.
100
See Parents Involved in Community Schools v Seattle School District, 426 F3d
1162, 1171 (9th Cir 2005) (en banc), reversed, 551 US 701 (2007).
101
See Parents Involved, 551 US at 733 (concluding that the program was not narrowly
tailored). See also Taxman v Board of Education, 91 F3d 1547, 1551 (3d Cir 1996)
(invalidating a race-based tiebreaker used to decide which of two government employees
would be laid off); Tevlin v Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago,
237 F Supp 2d 895, 899 (ND Ill 2002) (describing a program under which race was used to
choose among roughly equally qualified candidates for promotion); Portland State
University, Office of Affirmative Action and Equal Opportunity, Employment Affirmative
Action (2009), online at http://www.afm.pdx.edu/WHATSAFM.html (visited Feb 10, 2010)
(likewise describing an affirmative action program as including a racial tiebreaker for
qualified applicants); Henry Ramsey, Jr, Affirmative Action at American Bar Association
Approved Law Schools: 1979–1980, 30 J Legal Educ 377, 380–81 (1980) (describing a
typical process of summarily rejecting and summarily admitting applicants who appeared to
be easy cases, and then considering additional variables for the remaining pool).
96
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In neither case did the justices make much of the distinction between
a tiebreaking decision structure and other designs, but this choice did
surface in Parents Involved. The majority distinguished Seattle’s
tiebreaking program from the program upheld in Grutter partly because
“when race comes into play” in the Seattle program “it is decisive by
itself” and “is not simply one factor weighed with others in reaching a
decision.”102 This logic is difficult to take seriously, however, except as
an arbitrary basis for preserving some piece of Grutter. The Parents
Involved majority indicated its concern about the influence of race but
the decision structure is hardly a proxy for that. A tiebreaking decision
structure might mean that race is almost never considered, while an allthings-considered judgment might mean that race is always considered
and habitually decisive. It all depends on the variables in play and the
applicant pool, not the decision structure standing alone. A critic might
nonetheless believe that this school district used race too often, but that
is a different complaint. More telling is the Chief Justice’s less qualified
statement that the district should “stop assigning students on a racial
basis.”103 This is consistent with opposition to any consideration of race
regardless of the decision structure, without the logically awkward
suggestion that racial tiebreakers are especially troublesome.
Conceivably, the best elaboration of constitutional doctrine would
make tiebreakers inapposite. Perhaps the importance of the goal and the
propriety of the means are unaffected by the choice to place variables
such as race or sex or income in a tiebreaker position. At the same time,
we should understand that tiebreaking and non-tiebreaking decision
structures are functionally different. These differences should affect
nonconstitutional policy assessments, if not equal protection doctrine.
2. Evaluation.
Indeed it would be odd if those who oppose affirmative action are
more strongly against programs with tiebreakers, all else equal.
Relegating variables such as race or sex to a tiebreaker position tends to
reduce their importance in decisionmaking. Seattle could have designed
its program to look more like the University of Michigan’s, stirring race
together with other variables for every student applicant. But the
influence of race and outcomes might well be greater with that design.
Again, there is no way to tell without knowing the constellation of
variables, their relative weights, and the attributes of the applicant pool.
Insofar as affirmative action skeptics prefer that race be less rather than
more influential in decisionmaking, they should be at least indifferent to
tiebreaking decision structures when compared to all-things-considered
judgments.
102
103

Parents Involved, 551 US at 723 (emphasis added).
Id at 748.
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The more interesting question is whether proponents of affirmative
action should ever support a tiebreaking decision structure. One hitch
for them is feasibility. If proponents want to ensure that a critical mass
of some group is represented, and if they are also committed to a
relatively selective test for admissions and jobs and so on, then there
might not be enough potential affirmative action beneficiaries to achieve
both goals with a tiebreaking structure. When a variable such as race or
sex cannot be considered until lexically prior variables cancel out, and
when there are only a small number of potential affirmative action
beneficiaries who satisfy those lexically prior demands, there might not
be any benefits left over for the tiebreaker to award. Program designers
could make the lexically prior demands less selective, in order to reach
the tiebreaking stage more often. And they could reduce the number of
gradations in the lexically superior variables, which would tend to lump
more applicants together and increase the chance of ties. But under the
conditions just noted, selectivity would be sacrificed in favor of
diversity—for all applicants.
Even if a tiebreaking structure is feasible given the goals of
decisionmakers, affirmative action proponents have reason to choose
another design. The core question is why a variable such as race ought
to be relevant, yet only relevant when every other consideration washes
out.104 It is perfectly sensible for supporters to want such variables
available for use in every case. We might say that if the variable is a
plus factor for one applicant it should a plus factor for every applicant
with the same attribute. This seems true regardless of the rationale for
the relevance of an attribute such as race, sex, income, or whatever—
whether the program is aimed at capturing the advantages of diversity, or
remedying past discrimination, or accomplishing some other goal.
Affirmative action considerations can simply take their place alongside
other variables deemed relevant to good judgment. I am not aware of
contemporary proponents who contend that race or sex is a lexically
inferior consideration, as a moral matter, compared to factors such as
seniority or past performance or test scores or legacy status.105
Surely proponents have room to disagree over the appropriate weight
of affirmative action considerations, but these differences do not indicate
that those sympathetic to the goals of affirmative action believe that, say,
race is never significant enough to outweigh even the slightest
104

See generally Part II.A (investigating justifications for tiebreakers).
Proponents of affirmative action can hold that a minimum level of competence is a
prerequisite to additional evaluation without believing that affirmative action considerations
should be the only tiebreakers for choosing among minimally competent candidates. One
might reasonably conclude that the ability to graduate from a university is a necessary
attribute for admission, regardless of the applicant’s contribution to a valued form of
diversity. The less intuitive proposition for affirmative action proponents is that race- or sexrelated considerations bear a similarly inferior relationship to many other factors taken into
account after a minimum level of competence is established.
105

42

meaningful difference in, say, test scores. A tiebreaking decision
structure represents this kind of categorical ordering. Seattle’s school
assignment plan is, at most, a weak example to the contrary. After
parental preferences were gathered, only sibling status was prioritized
over racial composition; and limiting extremes in racial composition was
always more important than geographic proximity.106
Now, it is quite possible that affirmative action proponents can be
pushed into tiebreaking decision structures as a matter of politics.
Between the ardent supporters of critical mass and the hard-line
opponents of affirmative action might lie a compromise in which race or
sex may be considered only occasionally and only in otherwise close
cases. This might not be a bad description of some affirmative action
moderates, and a potential second-best result for proponents.107
But this possibility does not tell us how a principled position in favor
of affirmative action can deny the relevance of race or gender for all
applicants, except those who happen to be tied with another applicant on
every other relevant measure. Nor does it tell us why race or gender
should never be used to produce ties or reverse outcomes. As long as
one believes that the consideration of these variables makes the decision
procedure better rather than worse, then placing them in a tiebreaker
position will increase errors.108 If a tie would be intolerable, then a more
arbitrary variable might be used,109 or affirmative action considerations
could be double counted to break ties.110 If a tie would be acceptable, as
when evenly matched applicants can be both accepted or both rejected,
then no tiebreaker is necessary at all.
In addition, proponents have alternatives to tiebreakers, at least
theoretically. One option is to evaluate different groups separately to
ensure that a quota or goal is achieved. Instead of creating a tiebreaker,
106

See Parents Involved, 426 F3d at 1169, 1171 (noting that the sibling tiebreaker
accounted for 15 to 20 percent of admissions to the ninth grade class in an oversubscribed
school, and that distance accounted for 70 to 75 percent of such admissions).
107
Some justifications for opposing affirmative action might leave space for such
programs when applicants appear equally well-qualified. Thus those who believe that market
competition generally drives out inefficient racial stereotypes in employment decisions might
nevertheless believe that such stereotypes can persist with respect to job applicants who
appear tied. See Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group
Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 Harv L Rev 1003, 1073 (1995). In this
domain, affirmative action proposals might suffer less resistance, even if affirmative action
proponents have no principled reason to stop there.
108
See Part II.B.2.b (discussing relevant variables as tiebreakers).
109
See Part II.B.2.a (discussing randomization as a tiebreaker).
110
See Part II.B.2.c (discussing double counting). Recall that a potential downside of
double counting involves problematic incentives for those subject to the decision rule. But
not all variable values are subject to the control of interested parties. Depending on which
affirmative action considerations are used, applicants might have great difficulty entering and
exiting the relevant categories. Incentive effects might be minimal, and an increase in
applications from the targeted group might be helpful.
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a quota system creates two distinct decision procedures. Hence
proponents need not worry that an affirmative action tiebreaker will be
triggered too infrequently, or that other important indicators of merit will
be weakened too broadly. Quotas or numerical goals are relatively
simple extensions of a commitment to affirmative action, but of course
they are often either prohibited by law or unsustainable in politics.111
More realistically, affirmative action proponents can turn to allthings-considered judgments. These judgments may include race or sex
as a relevant variable with adequate weight to achieve whatever goal
proponents have in mind. They are also the kind of judgments that are
(or were) acceptable to the Supreme Court. It is not clear that a
tiebreaking decision structure will be viewed any more favorably by the
justices. Such structures could make controversial tiebreaking variables
more psychologically salient to judges and to critics of affirmative
action, even if those variables are equally or less likely to be decisive. If
nothing else, a multi-factor analysis of applicants can make the impact of
race, sex, and other variables more obscure.112 There is no indication of
leniency toward tiebreakers in Parents Involved, anyway. So, all-thingsconsidered judgments ought to attract support from affirmative action
proponents as a matter of principle, and perhaps strategic necessity.
Although the argument for designing affirmative action programs as
tiebreakers in a strict sense is relatively weak, it might be worth pausing
to consider whether the characteristics often singled out by affirmative
action programs might be good tiebreakers as a general matter. The
above discussion concentrated on moral reasoning, but intolerable ties
may also justify a tiebreaking decision structure. Is an attribute like race
or sex a promising candidate for tiebreaker status when other
considerations end in stalemate? One might believe that these
characteristics are basically “arbitrary” grounds for making judgments
about people.113 Although contemporary observers have shown that
111
On race-conscious but facially race-neutral alternatives, see, for example, Parents
Involved at 788–89 (2007) (Kennedy concurring) (mentioning “strategic site selection of new
schools” and “recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion” among other methods);
James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 Harv L Rev 131, 135–36
(2007).
112
Commentators have long pointed to the potential significance of appearances with
respect to race conscious decisionmaking. See, for example, Kenneth L. Karst and Harold
W. Horowitz, The Bakke Opinions and Equal Protection Doctrine, 14 Harv CR–CL L Rev 7,
14, 28–29 (1979) (discussing Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke as allowing affirmative
action programs to survive, perhaps via disguise); John Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal
World: Equality for the Negro—The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw U L Rev 363,
388, 407–10 (1966) (discussing political, pragmatic, and policy factors).
113
See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson, 477 US 57, 66–67 (1986). Critics of
affirmative action sometimes recommend lotteries in favor of racial tiebreakers, see Pauline
T. Kim, The Colorblind Lottery, 72 Fordham L Rev 9, 12–17 (2003) (collecting such
arguments), but the discussion in text is suggesting that random and racial tiebreakers might
have something in common.
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categories such as race and sex are not as easy to apply as casual
conversation tends to suggest,114 with additional specification they are
variables that are relatively easy to evaluate. They are probably easier to
assess than variables such as future effort or intelligence. One could also
conclude that the use of race or sex to decide merits questions is
sufficiently controversial, or so difficult to appropriately weight, such
that these factors should be considered, if at all, at a tiebreaking stage.
But of course variables like race or sex are special today, in a way
that makes utterly implausible their use as instruments of rationally
arbitrary decisionmaking. They are not like coin flips or phone numbers
or even phrenology. However defined, the categories of race and sex
have a unique history and political charge, and they correlate with
differences in life chances that many find unacceptable. If one of these
variables were consistently used as a tiebreaker within some domain, we
would be right to ask about the resulting patterns. If already
disadvantaged classes would end up worse off, the tiebreaker would
cause gratuitous harm. If disadvantaged classes would end up better off,
we would return to the controversial normative questions surrounding
affirmative action. The objectives of affirmative action, it seems, are
usually too important to be implemented through tiebreakers in a strict
sense, while the variables relevant to affirmative action are insufficiently
arbitrary to be attractive tiebreakers in general.
B. Interpretive Method
While the foregoing concentrated on the moral ranking of relevant
variables, tiebreakers in interpretive method can be motivated by the
conclusion that ties are intolerable. Across the history of modern
adjudication, apparently no judge has answered the question, “What does
this statute mean?” or “What does this constitutional provision mean?”
with the answer, “I don’t know” and left it at that.115 When litigants will
not settle, judges decide controversies one way or another. They must
have tools to resolve every close call. Interpretive method is one place
114

See, for example, Donald Braman, Of Race and Immutability, 46 UCLA L Rev
1375, 1427–32 (1999) (collecting human biodiversity studies); Camille Gear Rich,
Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of Title VII,
79 NYU L Rev 1134, 1145–71 (2004) (distinguishing racial discrimination from ethnic
discrimination).
115
See, for example, Watts v Indiana, 338 US 49, 62 (1949) (Jackson concurring and
dissenting) (“I do not know the ultimate answer to these questions [about due process, Court
authority, and custodial interrogation]; but, for the present, I should not increase the handicap
on society.”); United States v Robinson, 342 US 282, 286 (1945) (Rutledge dissenting)
(stating “I do not know what Congress meant” by a statutory exemption from the death
penalty, and concluding that the death penalty should not be imposed due to the vagueness).
Compare id at 286 (majority opinion of Black) (“We do not know what provision of law . . .
gives us power wholly to nullify the clearly expressed purpose of Congress to authorize the
death penalty because of a doubt as to the precise congressional purpose in regard to
hypothetical cases that may never arise.”).
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where this commitment manifests itself in a tiebreaking decision
structure.
1. Illustrations.
In describing how legal interpretation is supposed to work, one set of
sources or techniques is often characterized as lexically prior to another.
Hence a statute’s plain meaning (somehow ascertained) is said to trump
any other consideration that might be relevant to interpretation, such as
the lessons of legislative history.116 Consistent with a lexically inferior
ranking, legislative history is not available to create ambiguity in
statutory text—only to resolve it.117 Likewise, some canons of
construction are supposed to be consulted only when other tools of
interpretation yield doubt. Among the most famous is the rule of lenity
for criminal statutes, which is reserved for the closest cases. “The rule
of lenity . . . applies only when, after consulting traditional canons of
statutory construction, we are left with an ambiguous statute.”118 A
related practice is judges deferring to reasonable interpretations of
ambiguous federal statutes by federal agencies. If the statute is clear
(somehow tested), then judicial deference to the agency is
inappropriate.119
As a formal matter, tiebreaking canons can now be distinguished
from more flexible interpretive presumptions.120 These presumptions
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See Boyle v United States, 129 S Ct 2237, 2246 (2009) (stating that arguments
regarding statutory purpose, legislative history, and the rule of lenity were irrelevant because
the RICO statute was clear). See also Caminetti v United States, 242 US 470, 485 (1917)
(denying that interpretation is taking place when statutory meaning is plain).
117
See United States v Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co, 287 US 77, 83 (1932).
118
United States v Shabani, 513 US 10, 17 (1994), quoted in United States v Hayes, 129
S Ct 1079, 1088–89 (2009); id at 1093 (Roberts dissenting) (“Taking a fair view, the text . . .
is ambiguous, the structure leans in the defendant’s favor, the purpose leans in the
Government’s favor, and the legislative history does not amount to much. This is a textbook
case for application of the rule of lenity.”); United States v Santos, 128 S Ct 2020, 2025
(2008) (plurality opinion of Scalia) (“Under a long line of our decisions, the tie must go to
the defendant.”); Healy, 570–74 (cited in note 7) (discussing canons of statutory
interpretation as tiebreakers in cases of ambiguity).
119
See Chevron U.S.A. v NRDC, 467 US 837, 842–44 (1984) (stating the test in two
steps, the first asking whether the intent of Congress is clear and the second whether the
agency’s interpretation is permissible or reasonable). This formulation resembles a
tiebreaker, strictly defined, regardless of recent debates over when Chevron applies, see
Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 Georgetown L J 833,
873–89 (2001), whether Chevron is a good representation of legislative will, see Kenneth A.
Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative Policymaking, 118 Yale L J
64, 74–75 (2008), and whether judges should do a lot or a little thinking at step one.
However, the tiebreaker characterization is trickier if Chevron is reconceptualized as having
only one step. See Matthew C. Stephenson and Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One
Step, 95 Va L Rev 597 (2009).
120
See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict 189 (Oxford 1996)
(noting a difference between tiebreakers for equipoise and interpretive presumptions).
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include judicial disfavor of retroactivity,121 preemption,122 extraterritorial
application,123 and invalidity.124 Such leanings do not seem reserved for
the purpose of breaking ties, although they might be lexically inferior to
plain meaning. Insofar as they interact with other variables indicating
statutory meaning, they cannot be tiebreakers in a strict sense. And as a
matter of sheer logic, interpretive presumptions cannot eliminate the
chance of a tie. In fact it is theoretically possible for an interpretive
presumption to generate a tie when added to other relevant variables.
In addition to doctrinal formulations, academic theorists have
observed or recommended lexical ordering for interpretive problems.
Ronald Dworkin famously characterized legal interpretation as a process
that combines fit with justification.125 The former may dominate the
latter. Thus Dworkin has indicated that the best philosophical reading of
equal citizenship includes welfare rights, but that this outcome is
currently foreclosed to courts by considerations of fit.126 Although he is
at odds with Dworkin on many issues, Michael McConnell’s approach to
constitutional adjudication has an analogous structure. He contends that
the only judicial consideration should be fit—but because some cases
cannot be resolved on that basis, McConnell must have a supplemental
rule of decision. He then recommends judicial nonintervention to foster
ordinary politics.127 Another variation on the same structure is Randy
Barnett’s version of constitutional construction. When the original
public meaning of the Constitution yields indeterminacy, Barnett wants
judges to impose a presumption favoring libertarian results in order to
bolster the moral legitimacy of the document.128
These views are contested of course. But it is conventional wisdom
to believe that many interpretive issues are resolved by conventional
legal argument while a more difficult set of controversies—perhaps
made unavoidable by selection effects in litigation—are influenced by
judicial discretion or ideology. Extreme versions of the attitudinal
121
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model of judicial behavior129 are giving way to more nuanced views that
both ideology and preexisting legal sources influence outcomes.130 And
some observers seem content with an adjudicative system that allows
something like ideology to determine case outcomes after conventional
legal argument runs out. As Cardozo explained it, judges have “an
outlook on life, a conception of social needs, a sense . . . of ‘the total
push and pressure of the cosmos,’ which, when reasons are nicely
balanced, must determine where choice shall fall.”131
2. Evaluation.
Understanding interpretive method (or its exhaustion) as generating
a tiebreaking decision structure prompts a series of questions that should
now be familiar. They begin with the question whether a “tie” regarding
legal meaning would be intolerable in the context of adjudication. Is it
unacceptable for a judge to confess uncertainty and proceed no further?
This question is deep, and probably too deep. It calls for the defense of a
tradition of certitude and decisiveness within adjudication that is
longstanding if not unbroken. Such a defense is too difficult for
adequate treatment in this space. Instead I can offer two thoughts that
make a defense plausible.
First, adjudicative institutions should be assessed in relation to other
available dispute resolution mechanisms. Relatively few disagreements
will involve lawyers or courts, let alone final resolution by judges,132 and
the type of disputes that are adjudicated might have been resolved by
another method such as negotiated settlement or arbitration. These
alternative methods can be equally decisive without the commitment to
determinate resolution of legal meaning. It seems easier to defend the
129
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presence of one institution that guarantees a final answer regarding legal
meaning to all disputants who demand it when a variety of other
institutions provide no such guarantee. In this way courts can help end
contests among parties who cannot find other ways to stop the fighting,
while also offering public information about law’s content and thereby
preventing some number of future disputes, all without dominating the
socially necessary activity of dispute resolution.
Second, courts often will be acceptable locations for eliminating
legal uncertainty. Many details of statutory and constitutional law have
low stakes for society at large, or lack demonstrably high stakes.133 This
can be true even when such details are extremely important to the
relatively few litigants who find themselves in court. Telling litigants
that the applicable law is irreducibly unclear effectively removes
adjudication from the list of reliable dispute resolution mechanisms, and
shifts some of that burden to other institutions. Whatever arguments can
be made for some manner of legislative remand,134 it is not sensible for a
judiciary to refer every close call no matter how socially insignificant to
other lawmaking systems with responsibilities of their own.135 To be
sure, these observations tell us nothing about how judges should identify
and resolve legal uncertainty, nor do they justify a judicial commitment
to determinate legal meaning in all cases. Perhaps our system
overestimates the cost of legal uncertainty. But it would not be
surprising if a large fraction of truly hard questions regarding law’s
content are best answered, somehow, by judges.
Before moving forward, it is worth noting a view on which “ties” in
legal meaning are impossible. The degree to which legal meaning is
indeterminate is partly a function of the operative method of
interpretation. With a flexible understanding of “interpretation,”136 the
operative method might confidently answer all questions of meaning.
This point is an extension of Dworkin’s one-right-answer thesis,
although Dworkin himself indicates that the uniquely best answer can be
a tie.137 In any event, the idea is that different methods of interpretation
133
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will have different chances of producing indeterminacy.138 At the end of
the day, we observe zero legal-meaning ties in adjudication with respect
to any issue of consequence to the outcome. One might then say that the
interpretive method used by judges is free of ties.
This does not, however, obviate further evaluation of law’s
tiebreakers. Most important, there are lexical priorities within official
judicial statements on interpretive method that mandate a tiebreaking
decision structure. The absence of ties does not show the absence of
tiebreakers; the former can be a sign of a tiebreaker’s effectiveness.
There is a fair question regarding the motivation for lexical ordering
within interpretive method. Perhaps this prioritization is the result of
moral reasoning rather than, or in addition to, a particular problem with
ties in this setting. Perhaps the rule of lenity helps produce good judicial
decisions and yet is somehow so unimportant that it should not influence
any decisions in the absence of indeterminacy. In my view, it is
implausible that aversion to ties plays no role in the development of a
decisive interpretive method in court. Yet some lexically inferior
considerations within interpretive method could be morally and
categorically inferior to others. A critical evaluation of interpretive
tiebreakers is therefore appropriate.
How good, then, are the existing tiebreakers? Because interpretive
method is a work in progress within judiciaries, and because the actual
determinants of judicial behavior are subjects of ongoing debate, a
simple conclusion is elusive. But a few things are clear. First of all,
judges never overtly use randomization as an interpretive tiebreaker.139
Although this might be a mistake as a matter of ideal theory, practical
reasons do exist for a merits randomization ban in adjudicative
systems.140 Judges face a serious public relations problem when they use
lotteries and when their effort on a case cannot be verified by a relatively
uninformed citizenry. And if there were no such public skepticism, we
might fear overuse of randomization as a docket-clearing device.
Assuming that the number of appropriate occasions for merits lotteries is
small, merits randomization does not seem worth the complications. At
the same time, courts forfeit the ability to break ties on matters of legal
interpretation with the irrelevant, decisive, and low cost device of the
lottery.
It might seem strange but one hope for current practice is that it
relies on nearly arbitrary factors to resolve difficult interpretive
questions. Perhaps judges characterize these considerations in highminded fashion, as theoretically justified structural considerations or
138
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laudable traditions,141 but they turn out to be variables on the verge of
irrelevance. This could be something to celebrate. Unless lexically
inferior considerations are at most tangentially relevant to a sound
conclusion on legal meaning, they are strong candidates for
presumptions and other types of variables ordinarily used to answer
these questions. Again, a relatively unimportant variable can be given
lesser weight without demoting it to a tiebreaker position. The more
arbitrary the inferior variable, the more comfortable we should be.
The only way to definitively evaluate existing tiebreakers in
interpretive method is to settle on a normative framework. The moral
commitments animating these frameworks speak to what counts as a
good judgment regarding legal meaning, and thus what counts as a
legitimate source of law and legal interpretation. These are famously
contested matters. Some commentators are happy to have judges
consider a wide range of sources and use a wide range of techniques,
while others are stricter. Where one stands on these controversial issues
will influence whether one believes that, for example, consulting
legislative history is categorically inferior to leaning against
extraterritoriality.
Useful observations nevertheless can be made. We should be able to
agree that interpretive method for criminal statutes has developed a
powerful tiebreaker: the rule of lenity. The rule is extraordinarily
simple, making it cheap to operate and unambiguously decisive in every
applicable situation. Criminal defendants are easy to identify, so the rule
is effectively a single-value variable always pointing in the same
direction. Of course judges disagree over precisely when the rule ought
to be invoked,142 and knowing that a narrower interpretation is better
than a broad interpretation does not settle the precise meaning of the
statute. But a judge’s chance of resolving an interpretive issue arising
from a criminal statute well enough to decide case outcomes is
effectively 100 percent once the rule of lenity is in place.
The serious question is whether lenity is so unimportant that it ought
to be cabined in a tiebreaker position. As with affirmative action, we do
not see proponents of this variable denigrating its normative
significance.143 And there might be good reasons to prefer a rule of
lenity to a rule of severity, such as distrust of government and a
preference for private ordering. Too good, in fact: the stronger those
reasons, the more difficult it becomes to understand why lenity is not
one factor among many. If instead lenity is a poor value to use for
141

See, for example, United States v RLC, 503 US 291, 305 (1992) (plurality opinion of
Souter) (referring to the “venerable rule of lenity”).
142
For the view that judicial enforcement of the rule “is notoriously sporadic and
unpredictable,” see Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 S Ct Rev
345, 346.
143
Unless “venerable,” RLC, 503 US at 305, is a misnomer for “old or inexplicable.”

51

interpretive decisions, then it should not be considered at any stage of
the decision procedure. And if avoiding ties is an independent priority
for decisionmakers, lenity can be double counted. Lenity could be one
variable of some strength at the front end of interpretation, and a
decisive variable is cases of indeterminacy. There seems to be no simple
and persuasive rebuttal to this critique.
The situation on the civil side is messier.
Civil statutory
interpretation lacks a universal tiebreaker that can assure decisive
outcomes. Some considerations that might be lexically inferior to plain
text readings—such as legislative history—are unlikely to decisively
resolve every close call if honestly used. Other lexically inferior
considerations—such as Chevron deference—are decisive but do not
reach every issue of civil statutory interpretation. When no agency
offers an interpretation, there is no agency interpretation eligible for
tiebreaking deference. Although some lexically inferior considerations
in civil statutory interpretation might be fairly demeaned as relatively
frivolous, it is hard to belittle all of them.144 It is especially tricky to
belittle them without proving their illegitimacy. This is the case with
legislative history. Justices who are skeptical of legislative history have
good arguments for ignoring it completely,145 while those attracted to
legislative history seem unlikely to confine it to a last-ditch tiebreaker
position.146
What is most interesting is that, even on the civil side, where there is
no universal interpretive tiebreaker, no judge stops in frustration. Every
judge reaches a decisive conclusion on every interpretive question they
face. Even the most enthusiastic proponents of using legislative history
to inform statutory meaning have never ended in equipoise. Yet by
collapsing many sources into a single stage of decision, one would
expect indeterminacy to result every so often. It does not. This suggests
a broader insight: any judge’s formal description of interpretive method
probably will not capture the actual mechanics of decision. Of course
there is nothing surprising about a gap between official formulations of
interpretive method and judicial behavior. It is often only after a
144
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detailed discussion of case facts and procedural history that the Supreme
Court will declare something like, “We start [sic], as always [sic], with
the language of the statute.”147 And judicial precedent seems to act as a
trump over other legal texts, at least when judges are adequately
comfortable with the merits of the precedent. But I mean something
more than the mundane observation that judges imperfectly describe
their actual rules of decision.
Combining a commitment to providing determinate legal meaning
with the reality of countless difficult interpretive questions makes a
tiebreaking decision structure extremely useful, or even essential. When
we observe unswerving determinacy from judges who do not specify a
tiebreaker, judicial practices probably are departing from judicial
prescriptions for interpretation in a particular way. Judges might be
finding ways to break ties that are even better than canons such as the
rule of lenity. More specifically, we might hope that judges are engaged
in undeclared double counting.
Consider the use of interpretive presumptions. As a formal matter
they are not reserved for use as tiebreakers, so they should produce ties
in some number of cases. Every so often, the presumption against
preemption should just counterbalance every other relevant variable in
civil statutory interpretation. We know that interpretive presumptions
are never used this way and yet we observe no recognized ties. This is
true even if no tiebreaking canon of construction appears. Interpretive
presumptions might, therefore, occasionally operate as tiebreakers
regardless of how they are officially characterized. This could happen in
two ways.
One possibility is that a judge will shelve an interpretive
presumption unless and until other considerations leave her uncertain as
to the statute’s meaning. An interpretive presumption can be stressed at
the end of an opinion and portrayed as the decisive consideration. The
presumption is the kicker for the court. We cannot be sure that the
presumption played no role until uncertainty was confronted, but we
cannot rule out the possibility either. In this scenario, the so-called
presumption might have been misdescribed. If so, it is a tiebreaker and
it is subject to the commendations and concerns raised above.
A second possibility is potentially more optimistic. Judges might
sometimes double count an interpretive presumption for tiebreaking
purposes. In other words, a judge might consider a presumption such as
aversion to preemption up front along with other indications of legal
meaning and then, if indeterminacy becomes a threat, return to the
presumption as a way to avoid stalemate. If so, the judge avoids the
sacrifice of presumably relevant information during the lexically
superior decision stage while also avoiding the problems of uncertainty
147
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in legal meaning. As I have explained, double counting comes with
incentive problems, but it can reduce errors in adjudicating cases.148
There is some value, therefore, in judges departing from the apparent
design of interpretive presumptions where no other tiebreaker is
available.149 And there is then a sound argument for making the rule of
lenity a universal presumption in criminal statutory interpretation, if it is
to be considered at all, and for reintroducing that factor or some other
relevant variable when tiebreaking is necessary.
C. Law as Life’s Tiebreaker
In a very loose sense, every law is a tiebreaker. By providing rules
to facilitate coordination, cooperation, zero-sum dispute resolution, and
order in general, laws help people resolve doubt and disagreement that
otherwise interfere with healthy social life. One might therefore say that
law breaks ties even as it serves a variety of social functions.150 As
explained above, however, this understanding of tiebreaking is wildly
inclusive.151 It extends to all decision rules. The better question is
whether law should be characterized as a tiebreaker in a more strict
sense—as a set of decision rules and associated institutions that are
lexically inferior to another set of rules operated by a different set of
institutions. Below I suggest that the answer is, to a significant degree,
yes. But I recognize that legal institutions interact with other institutions
in ways that many tiebreakers do not. Indeed this interaction opens
possibilities for the constructive double counting of variables relevant to
both law and the rest of social life.
1. Characterizations.
Several struts support the tiebreaker analogy for law and, more
particularly, for courts. The first is the manner in which ordinary people
view and treat law and adjudication. Whether or not people generally
148
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prefer private ordering to other types of politics, our courts are far from
the first place that ordinary people turn to resolve their grievances.
Many people might report that calling a lawyer should be the last resort
for solving problems,152 and parts of the country have a stated social
norm against some kinds of litigation.153 Litigation is not a good
reputation-builder, while criticism for failing to seek legal redress is rare.
Abraham Lincoln once wrote—and, more to the point, people still point
out that Abraham Lincoln once wrote—“Discourage litigation. Persuade
your neighbors to compromise whenever you can.”154
In addition to the indications of litigation’s backseat status in popular
opinion is the evidence that people steer their claims away from courts.
Available studies indicate that less formal dispute resolution
mechanisms settle the bulk of all grievances before they reach a lawyer,
let alone a courtroom. A classic survey by Richard Miller and Austin
Sarat reported that approximately 10 percent of felt grievances made
their way to a lawyer and only 5 percent to a court.155 Neighbors often
talk out their differences, employers and employees often accommodate
each other, and injured parties often lump it—letting their losses lie long
before any judge tells them that they must. Much of this pattern of
behavior is consistent with simple models of settlement when parties
roughly agree on the expected outcome in court.156 If nothing else,
152
See Barbara A. Curan, The Legal Needs of the Public: A Final Report of a National
Survey 235 table 6.8, 240–41 figure 6.1 (1977) (showing survey responses ranging from over
one-third to over half, depending on the cohort). I have found no more recent poll.
153
See Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors
in Shasta County, 38 Stan L Rev 623, 681–85 (1986) (finding a social norm against formal
trespass claims for damages among rural neighbors).
154
Abraham Lincoln, Fragment: Notes for a Law Lecture (1850), in The Collected
Works of Abraham Lincoln: Supplement 1832–1865 18, 19 (Rutgers 1974) (Roy P. Basler,
ed), quoted in, for example, Warren E. Burger, Isn’t There a Better Way?, 68 ABA J 274,
275 (1982); Shawn J. Bayern, Comment, Explaining the American Norm Against Litigation,
93 Cal L Rev 1697, 1699 (2005).
155
See Miller and Sarat at 536–44 (cited in note 132) (noting that the level of
litigiousness often depends upon the type of claim the plaintiff could potentially seek). See
also Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know
(and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L
Rev 4, 20–21 (1983) (discussing survey results regarding consumers). Other studies use
expert evaluation in an attempt to isolate only legally cognizable claims for the denominator.
See Consortium on Legal Services and the Public, Legal Needs and Civil Justice: A Survey
of Americans—Major Findings from the Comprehensive Legal Needs Study 7–8, 17–19
(1994) (reporting that low- and middle-income people with “legal needs” either do nothing or
use nonjudicial mechanisms more often than they resort to the civil justice system, although
showing that use of the civil justice system is common for family matters); Michael J. Saks,
Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—And Why
Not?, 140 U Pa L Rev 1147, 1183–90 (1992) (reviewing medical malpractice studies and
concluding that victims rarely complain, perhaps because of perceived litigation costs
including stigma, although noting that severe injuries and automobile accidents seem to
prompt higher litigation rates).
156
See George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 6
J Legal Stud 1, 4–5 (1984). For more on the model, see text accompanying notes 221–224.

55

preventable litigation costs encourage otherwise disputatious parties to
split their differences.157 Even if the United States is more litigious than
many other comparable nations, which is an assertion subject to doubt,
our courts are simply not in the forefront of dispute resolution writ
large.158
Infrequency and unpopularity do not establish that litigation is
lexically inferior to any other system, but additional features of modern
adjudication pull it toward the tail end of dispute resolution sequences.
These features are part of the official design of our judiciaries. Most
important, judges respect and encourage negotiated settlements.
The simple truth is that a valid settlement trumps preexisting rights
to litigate the covered claims. Judicial support for settlement comes in
the form of an expressed preference for it in civil cases, backed by a
usual willingness to respect these agreements despite ex post complaints
of irregularity or injustice.159 Whatever the limits on contracting away
litigation rights, there is no general fairness check on negotiated
settlements.160 In a similar spirit, the federal policy supporting many
commercial arbitration agreements161 indicates that traditional courts
have moved toward a tiebreaking role even for garden-variety legal
disputes. And although judicial practice is not so explicitly promotional
157
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when it comes to plea bargains,162 such negotiated resolutions tend to
stick. Moreover, our judiciaries are not designed to handle many more
criminal trials without seriously cheapening the procedure that they now
offer. By the early 1970s, the Supreme Court called plea bargaining “an
essential component of the administration of justice.
Properly
administered, it is to be encouraged.”163
Of course settlement negotiations take place in law’s shadow,164 and
in this respect settlement cannot be insulated from adjudication. At least
as a matter of strategy, settlement and adjudication are related. But this
does not undermine the analogy between adjudication and tiebreaking.
A lexically inferior stage of a decision procedure may influence the
behavior of players at an earlier stage without forfeiting tiebreaker
status. That a soccer team strives to prevent (or reach) a penalty
shootout does not affect the characterization of the shootout as a
tiebreaker.
Were respect for settlement the judiciary’s entire settlement policy,
however, the tiebreaker analogy might seem inapt. Judges can respect
the settlements they come across without telling parties to negotiate
before they litigate. An apparently high settlement rate165 obviously
cannot prove that there is a judicial commitment to prioritizing
settlement efforts. Settlement rates are driven, among other factors, by
the amount of litigation costs that can be avoided, by the predictability of
trial outcomes, and by relatively low stakes for the parties. None of
these factors show that judiciaries are consciously designed to provide a
lexically inferior second stage dispute resolution mechanism, or that
other alternatives should be exhausted before litigation is appropriate.
But settlement gets more than respect. If courts ever were
indifferent to settlement efforts, they are not now. Over the last several
decades, as caseloads and skepticism about the virtues of litigation
162
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(calculating a post-commencement settlement rate of nearly 68 percent).
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seemed to increase, judges around the country developed techniques for
encouraging parties to settle claims.166 Alongside the emergence of an
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) movement outside the courts, the
judiciary’s own efforts to manage and settle litigation were among the
major developments in twentieth century dispute resolution.167 Turning
points were marked, for example, when the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were amended in 1983 to explicitly authorize the use of
pretrial conferences to facilitate settlement;168 when parties became
obligated to discuss settlement possibilities at their initial planning
conference;169 and when the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998
instructed district courts to adopt local rules requiring “that litigants in
all civil cases consider the use of an alternative dispute resolution
process at an appropriate stage in the litigation.”170
Thus trial judges may and do encourage settlement. They possess a
number of methods by which to make settlement more attractive and
litigation less so.171 For instance, district courts can require parties and
attorneys to spend time and other resources on settlement conferences,172
they can demand that parties explore the potential of mediation,173 they
can have parties listen to the impressions of a third-party expert through
early neutral-evaluation programs,174 and they can set an early trial date
166
See Judith Resnik, Aggregation, Settlement, and Dismay, 80 Cornell L Rev 918, 939
(1995) (citing docket overload and litigation disillusionment as motivators).
167
See Edward F. Sherman, The Impact on Litigation Strategy of Integrating
Alternative Dispute Resolution into the Pretrial Process, 168 FRD 75, 75–77 (1996)
(discussing the development of court-annexed alternative dispute resolution into the 1990s).
168
See Fed R Civ P 16(a)(5) (including settlement promotion as a goal).
169
See Fed R Civ P 26(f)(2).
170
28 USC § 652(a). District courts may, however, exempt cases from this requirement.
See id § 652(b).
171
See generally Manual for Complex Litigation 167–74 (4th ed 2004) (discussing
specific techniques); Robert J. Niemic, Donna Stienstra, and Randall E. Ravitz, Guide to
Judicial Management of Cases in ADR 1–10, 39–45, 128–35 (2001) (discussing federal
court-annexed ADR options); Jona Goldschmidt and Lisa Milord, Judicial Settlement Ethics:
Judges’ Guide 70–73 (American Judicature Society & State Justice Institute 1996) (listing
settlement-promotion techniques). On court-annexed efforts in the federal courts in the years
before the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, see Elizabeth Plapinger and Donna
Stienstra, ADR and Settlement in the Federal District Courts: A Sourcebook for Judges and
Lawyers 3–6, 60–69 (1996) (noting the popularity of mediation programs).
172
See Fed R Civ P 16(c)(1), (c)(2)(I) (authorizing district courts to compel availability
to consider possible settlement and to use “special procedures” to facilitate settlement). See
also G. Heileman Brewing Co, Inc v Joseph Oat Corp, 871 F2d 648, 652–53 (7th Cir 1989)
(en banc) (relying on inherent judicial authority to penalize the failure to send a corporate
representative with settlement authority); Shedden v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 196 FRD 484,
486 (ED Mich 2000) (ordering corporate officer presence at trial in response to a nosettlement policy); Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 Va L Rev 1117 (1990)
(discussing a duty to settle imposed by courts on insurers of defendants).
173
See 28 USC § 652(a)–(b). See also In re Atlantic Pipe Corp, 304 F3d 135 (1st Cir
2002) (recognizing inherent authority to require mediation efforts, with parties sharing costs).
174
See 28 USC § 652(a)–(b).
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to jumpstart negotiations.175 Many courts also increase the litigation
costs that a party would otherwise bear if the party rejects a settlement
offer that ends up being more favorable than the result at trial.176 All of
this makes negotiated settlement not just respected but also, in
significant ways, encouraged as a prior step in dispute resolution.
Settlement promotion policies are not the only way in which law
molds courts into tiebreakers. Consider as well the rise of administrative
agencies and the judicial response. The modern administrative state now
conducts an enormous amount of adjudication that might have been
lodged in traditional courts alone.177 Over time, judges accommodated
this overlap in jurisdiction, by accepting or perhaps demanding judicial
review of agency outcomes.178 More than this, judges developed a
doctrine of exhaustion that required aggrieved parties to seek
administrative remedies before turning to the courts. The Supreme
Court now relies on both the Administrative Procedure Act179 and a
freestanding doctrine of exhaustion to constrain the timing of judicial
intervention when federal agency action is under challenge.180 And
while a § 1983 suit against a state or local official ordinarily overcomes
any obligation to exhaust state administrative remedies,181 there is a
notable exception for prisoner plaintiffs,182 and the Court’s requirement
for maturation of takings claims has a similar effect.183 None of this
175
See Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 Notre Dame L Rev 1561,
1592 (2003) (noting that there are few rules governing what judges can and cannot do to
encourage settlement).
176
See Fed R Civ P 68 (regarding formal offers from defendants); Cal Code Civ P § 998
(applying to both plaintiff and defendant offers); Tex R Civ P 167.4 (same). See also Delta
Airlines, Inc v August, 450 US 346, 352 (1981) (characterizing the purpose of Rule 68 as
settlement promotion).
177
See Richard E. Levy and Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Procedure and the
Decline of the Trial, 51 U Kan L Rev 473, 473–77 (2003) (describing the rise).
178
See, for example, Bowen v Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 US 667,
670 (1985) (“We begin with the strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of
administrative action.”); Crowell v Benson, 285 US 22, 51–62 (1932) (permitting agency
adjudication of fact questions relevant to a “private right” but with judicial review); Laurence
H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 285–98 (West 3d ed 2000) (tracing the wax and
wane of the “private rights“ distinction); Richard H. Fallon, Of Legislative Courts,
Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 Harv L Rev 915, 946–48 (1988)
(recommending appellate review as the Article III-preserving check on agency adjudication).
179
5 USC § 500 et seq.
180
See Darby v Cisneros, 509 US 137, 153–54 (1993) (explaining that the
Administrative Procedure Act governs exhaustion requirements for certain claims, while “the
exhaustion doctrine continues to apply as a matter of judicial discretion” in other cases).
181
See Patsy v Board of Regents, 457 US 496, 502–11 (1982).
182
See 42 USC § 1997e(a).
183
See Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v Hamilton Bank of
Johnson City, 473 US 172, 186–99 (1985) (faulting a § 1983 takings plaintiff for not first
seeking relief via zoning variances and an inverse condemnation action). If, however, a state
court actually reaches the merits of a federal takings claim while the claimant seeks state
relief, a subsequent federal court judgment might be precluded. See San Remo Hotel v City
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pushes all legal institutions into a lexically inferior status, but it does
make traditional litigation look more like a tiebreaker than step one in
dispute resolution.
This brings us to a smattering of jurisdictional and justiciability
doctrines under which courts stay their hands without tying them
forever. On this score, some of Alexander Bickel’s passive virtues for
the federal courts184 can be recharacterized as building blocks for a
tiebreaking decision structure.
Consider judicial demands that
controversies ripen before adjudication is appropriate,185 and that
advisory opinions not issue in advance of concrete and pressing
conflict.186 Certain federalism-related constraints on federal jurisdiction
have a similar character, although they divide one set of courts from
another. Recall that federal courts should neither interfere with pending
criminal prosecutions,187 nor reach federal constitutional questions when
a state court interpreting state law might make an answer unnecessary.188
Each of these doctrines permits courts to maintain overlapping authority
while moving judicial involvement toward later stages of a dispute. In
the federal system at least, a tradition has developed in which the
judiciary receives and maintains relatively broad subject matter
jurisdiction and, at the same time, tends to manage and constrain its
operations so that other institutions move first, if not last.189 It is part of
and County of San Francisco, 545 US 323, 345–46 (2005) (noting the strong interests in
finality and comity).
184
See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the
Bar of Politics 111–98 (Bobbs-Merrill 2d ed 1986). We must be careful to isolate doctrine
that permits courts to share subject matter with another institution, rather than defining
separate spheres of responsibility. For instance, the political questions doctrine does not
make courts into last-ditch dispute resolution mechanisms; its aspiration is to shut the
courthouse door against a category of disputes that judges want resolved elsewhere. See
Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 217 (1962); Jesse H. Choper, The Political Question Doctrine:
Suggested Criteria, 54 Duke L J 1457, 1461–62 (2005) (examining the proper scope of the
doctrine). For an account of the doctrine’s weakening, see Rachel Barkow, More Supreme
than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy,
102 Colum L Rev 156 (2002).
185
See, for example, Texas v United States, 523 US 296, 300–02 (1998) (denying
ripeness where the state procedure to be protected had not been and might not be used);
Abbott Laboratories v Gardner, 387 US 136, 148–49 (1967) (looking for hardship in the
absence of immediate adjudication plus present fitness for judicial resolution).
186
See United States v Freuhauf, 365 US 146, 157 (1961) (expressing concern over
issues that lack focus when not preceded by proper adversarial contestation); Felix
Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 Harv L Rev 1002, 1004 (1924) (“[T]he
legislature must be given ample scope for putting its prophecies to the test of proof.”).
187
See, for example, Younger v Harris, 401 US 37, 43–44 (1971). Parties inhibited by
Younger abstention may end up litigating federal claims in the Supreme Court on direct
review or in a lower federal court on habeas.
188
See, for example, Railroad Commission of Texas v Pullman Co, 312 US 496, 499–
502 (1941). Federal litigation detoured by Pullman abstention may return to the abstaining
court.
189
On the expansion of federal jurisdiction, see, for example, Samuel Issacharoff and
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an old, albeit contested, idea that “federal courts may exercise power
only in the last resort, and as a necessity.”190
As many of the preceding examples indicate, federal courts in
particular emphasize their place at the back of the dispute resolution line.
To be blunt, federal judges are last-word freaks. The most famous
illustration is the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution,
which, in the Court’s view, is final and supreme.191 But the desire to
give the final word runs deeper than that. Federal judges have long
indicated that they would rather say nothing than submit to direct review
by other officials. Hence the prospect of nonjudicial review prompts
federal judges to refuse to offer a judgment in the first place.192
Otherwise they would lose their place in line (last, that is). A statutory
mandate that federal courts reopen their own final judgments prompted a
related constitutional protest in Plaut v Spendthrift Farm, Inc.193
Rejecting this effort, the Court found within Article III a “fundamental
principle” that protects the federal judiciary’s “power, not merely to rule
on cases, but to decide them, subject to review only by superior courts in
the Article III hierarchy.”194 Perhaps every decision leaves opportunities
for a workaround, even if it is as inconvenient as Article V or the
appointment of new judges. But federal judges plainly want their
solutions for individual cases to appear last in time and to be respected
thereafter.
A final component of the tiebreaker analogy is more subtle. It is a
message suggested by several decision rules designed for hard
questions—rules that share a preference for the status quo or for
nonintervention. Some qualify as tiebreakers themselves. One is the
preponderance of the evidence rule in civil litigation: the defendant
prevails if the evidence of liability is equally strong on both sides.195
Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L Rev 1353 (2006). For the
latest major struggle to retain judicial oversight, see Boumediene v Bush, 128 S Ct 2229,
2241 (2008) (preserving habeas jurisdiction over Guantánamo Bay detainees). On the
differences with respect to state courts, see Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive
Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 Harv L Rev 1833 (2001).
190
Allen v Wright, 468 US 737, 752 (1984) (quotation marks omitted), quoting Chicago
and Grand Trunk Railway Co v Wellman, 143 US 339, 345 (1892).
191
See United States v Morrison, 529 US 598, 616 n 7 (2000); Cooper v Aaron, 358 US
1, 18 (1958). That is, until new law is made via Article V or by the Court itself.
192
See Chicago and S. Air Lines v Waterman SS Corp, 333 US 103, 113 (1948) (“[I]f
the President may completely disregard the judgment of the court, it would be only because it
is one the courts were not authorized to render.”).
193
514 US 211 (1995).
194
Id at 218–19, quoting Frank Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 Case W Res L Rev
905, 926 (1990) (“[A] ‘judicial Power’ is one to render dispositive judgments.”).
195
See Pennsylvania Railroad Co v Chamberlain, 288 US 333, 339 (1933) (explaining
the adverse consequence of bearing the burden of persuasion “where proven facts give equal
support to each of two inconsistent inferences”). The preponderance rule is a tiebreaker in
the loose sense. It is more like a unitary majority vote requirement than a lexically inferior
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The entirety of civil adjudication is to that extent biased toward prior
outcomes in other arenas of social life. On the criminal law side we
might view the rule of lenity, as well as the demand for proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, as serving a similar value of nonintervention.196 When
we turn to appeals, the message is much the same. Trial court judgments
are affirmed, not reversed, when the appellate panel is equally
divided.197 A final pro–status quo decision rule for close calls applies in
legislatures, although it might be less decisive if the agenda remains
flexible. Like the rule for equally divided judges, an equally divided
legislative vote normally means that the relevant proposition fails.198
Note, too, that the background value of nonintervention or status quo
bias can still yield cleanly decisive judgments on the merits. All of the
above rules accomplish this, especially those used in court. We cannot
say that the application of these rules remove courts from the decision
structure altogether. Instead they help courts reach decisions in favor of
other dispute resolution mechanisms.
There are counterexamples, of course. Consider the ability of states
to mandate the death penalty when a jury concludes that aggravating and
mitigating circumstances are in equipoise,199 along with the vice
president’s tiebreaking vote in the Senate.200 Status quo bias is hardly
the rationale for these rules. In addition, the status quo can be difficult
to identify, as when a candidate election is tied, two cars reach an
intersection at the same time, an agency’s statutory interpretation is
defended under Chevron,201 or a judge on habeas review cannot tell
rule. See Part I.A–I.B.1. Thus Illinois courts used to allow a separate jury instruction to the
effect that “if the evidence is evenly balanced, then the jury shall find for the defendant,” see
Alexander v Sullivan, 78 NE2d 333, 336 (Ill App Ct 1948), but contemporary thinking is that
this instruction is technically accurate but “slanted” and unhelpful, see Illinois Pattern Jury
Instructions—Civil 4.15 (2008). Contrast New Jersey Model Jury Charge (Civil) § 1:12I
(including such an instruction).
196
See text accompanying note 118 (discussing lenity). Whether or not proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is a tiebreaker loosely defined, it supports the general point being made in
the text.
197
See Warner-Lambert Co, LLC v Kent, 128 S Ct 1168, 1168 (2008) (per curiam).
See also 28 USC § 2109 (similar result in the absence of a quorum in the Supreme Court,
except in cases of direct appeal from district courts); Morrison Knudsen Corp v Fireman’s
Fund Insurance Co, 175 F3d 1221, 1239 (10th Cir 1999) (holding that the appellant loses
when the appendix is incomplete and prevents review). Alternatively this rule could be
justified on grounds of clarity: “reversal” might leave more confusion than outright
affirmance.
198
See Tarr and O’Connor, Congress A to Z at 472 (cited in note 5); Robert, Robert’s
Rules at 392 (cited in note 1). An additional justification involves stability: approving
motions on tie votes might leave those measures open to wasteful reconsideration, assuming
no agenda restrictions, while defeating them avoids this oscillation. In any event, the current
rule does not stop advocates of change from tinkering with their proposal and bringing the
revised version to a new vote.
199
See Kansas v Marsh, 548 US 163, 181 (2006).
200
See note 5.
201
See note 119.
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whether a trial error was harmless.202 But the counterexamples will not
eliminate a modest theme of nonintervention in law’s tiebreakers—a
value that nevertheless produces merits judgments for particular
disputes. And that theme softly reinforces the notion that law and
adjudication are not designed to be society’s first resort for dispute
resolution.
The tiebreaker analogy is admittedly imperfect. Legal institutions do
not generally demand an exhaustive effort at reconciliation within other
systems first. Some people are willing and able to seek relief in politics
or adjudication rather quickly. Nor do courts always cower in a small
corner of social life. Judges can be more forward than that.203
Moreover, litigation is in one sense subsidized: filing fees are well
below the actual cost of running the court system. Plus judges disavow
“coercion” of parties into settlement, leaving their power to avoid merits
adjudication weaker than it might be.204 Equally important, judicial
settlement efforts are often annexed to the litigation process instead of
segregated from it. This makes settlement less like a separate stage of
dispute resolution. Finally, significant issues are not resolved “finally”
by legal institutions or anyone else. Individual parties might accept the
fate assigned to them by judicial judgments, and so their particular
dispute might end, but broader normative and empirical questions can be
given only provisional answers in these settings.205 As to those
questions, court decisions are episodes in a cycle of debate more than
end-of-the-line tiebreakers.
A useful analogy between adjudication and tiebreakers nonetheless
survives these qualifications. The resemblance is clear enough once we
combine mainstream attitudes and practices regarding resort to legal
institutions, the respect for and promotion of negotiated settlement by
our judiciaries, the jumble of legal norms that channel disputes toward
administrative agencies and other forums before adjudication, the ways
202

See O’Neal v McAninch, 513 US 432, 435 (1995). The same rule applies on direct
review but the application to habeas is less explicable as status quo bias. See id at 442–43
(stressing the danger of custody infected by constitutional error).
203
To take one example, the Supreme Court invalidated government sex discrimination
while the Equal Rights Amendment was being debated in state legislatures. See Frontiero v
Richardson, 411 US 677, 687–88 (1973) (plurality opinion of Brennan) (using congressional
approval for the amendment as support for strict scrutiny); id at 692 (Powell concurring)
(objecting to strict scrutiny given the ongoing ratification debate, although not to judicial
invalidation of the sex classification at issue).
204
See In re NLO, Inc, 5 F3d 154, 157–58 (6th Cir 1993) (holding that district courts
may not order parties to participate in summary jury trials); Kothe v Smith, 771 F2d 667,
669–70 (2d Cir 1985) (holding that a district judge improperly sanctioned one side to a
dispute for failing to settle before trial). Actually, the anti-coercion principle partly supports
the analogy: if judges always mandate settlement, adjudication would have no ties to break.
205
See, for example, Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 Mich L Rev
577, 653 (1993) (describing judicial review as part of “an elaborate discussion” with the
public).
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in which legal norms often skew toward nonintervention in hard cases,
and the judicial commitment to giving only final answers in particular
disputes.
In fact, we can examine the most assertive-seeming instances of
judicial adjudication and find a prior stage of roughly the same dispute
to which the judges were responding. Bush v Gore,206 for example,
came only after it appeared that Bush and Gore were nearly tied at the
ballot box.207 Many believe that the Court should not have intervened at
any stage of the dispute given the alternative mechanisms for resolution,
such as the pathways marked by the Electoral Count Act.208 There is
good reason to criticize the Court majority on this score, although the
election might well have been contested longer and without a different
outcome had the Court not intervened. But can we imagine the Court
announcing the victor before Election Day? Before any machine or
manual recount was conducted?209 In the case that was actually decided,
respect for the Court’s judgment ended a recount—not every count. And
the judgment was a product of a practice called judicial “review.”210
2. Evaluation.
As a matter of fact and by design, judiciaries tend to be late-stage
decisionmakers. From this tiebreaking perspective, there are at least
three plausible normative reactions to the health of our legal system.
Each of them reflects an important theory of what law is and ought to be
about. The first reaction is dismay. Perhaps courts supply rational
deliberation on core public values and they should not be taking a
backseat to inferior institutions. The second reaction emphasizes
effective dispute resolution rather than rational norm generation. It
involves acceptance of, or even hope for, randomness in adjudication.
The third reaction suggests a somewhat more optimistic conclusion. It is
that legal institutions are inescapably and appropriately double counting
social values as they end disputes that are not resolved elsewhere. I
offer a few words on each.
a) Life as law’s tiebreaker? For some observers, judiciaries fail
to perform their unique role when they leave center stage on issues of
206

531 US 98, 110 (2000) (per curiam).
See id at 100–03 (describing counts, recounts, litigation, remand, and more).
208
See 3 USC §§ 5–7, 15–18; Bush v Gore, 531 US at 153 (Breyer dissenting); Samuel
Issacharoff, Political Judgments, 68 U Chi L Rev 637, 639, 651–53 (2001). See also id at
656 (suggesting that the Court had “a warrant to enter the political fray” only “when no other
institutional actor could repair the damage”).
209
Compare Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, 531 US 70, 78 (2000) (per
curiam) (remanding for clarification of a decision that required inclusion of some manual
recounts).
210
See Adam M. Samaha, Originalism’s Expiration Date, 30 Cardozo L Rev 1295, 1312
(2008) (“In our system, nonjudicial actors bear initial responsibility for understanding the
Constitution’s meaning.”).
207
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public importance. Judges have a particular way of evaluating problems,
a particular way of explaining their conclusions, and a particular set of
information on which they act. In their best light, courts contribute a
forum for rational deliberation about the appropriate content of law
using valuable data about the real world that is generated by disputing
parties. This heroic vision of judicial behavior is suggested by Bickel’s
hope that judges would follow “the ways of the scholar,”211 and Ronald
Dworkin’s perception that courts offer a “forum of principle” that is
often absent from the machinations of other institutions.212 On this view,
neither private ordering nor ordinary politics can deliver satisfying
answers to the deep questions of law’s proper character; pushing courts
into a tiebreaking role would be senseless at best.
Owen Fiss advanced a similar perspective even as court dockets
grew, the ADR movement surged, and judges ramped up efforts to
manage and settle cases. In an iconic article, Against Settlement, Fiss
characterized the mission of judicial adjudication as the development of
public values in a forum less affected by power inequalities. “Like plea
bargaining,” he wrote, “settlement is a capitulation to the conditions of
mass society . . . . Someone has to confront the betrayal of our deepest
ideals and be prepared to turn the world upside down to bring those
ideals to fruition.”213 Although Fiss had little interest in devoting public
resources to solely private disputes,214 he wanted judges to forge ahead
in cases involving public values, or cases in which society’s weaker
members claim that law mandates disruption of private ordering or
politics as usual.215 Judges should not be seen as regretful tiebreakers of
any kind, then, but as public officials authorized “to enforce and create
society-wide norms, and perhaps even to restructure institutions.”216 At
the logical extreme, we might say that the crude bargaining of social life
ought to be a lexically inferior tiebreaker for debates not reached by the
more pristine rationality of the court system.
There is something magnificent about these claims, and not only
211

Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 25–26 (cited in note 184) (“Judges have, or
should have, the leisure, the training, and the insulation to follow the ways of the
scholar . . . .”).
212
Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 NYU L Rev 469, 518 (1981). See also
Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 71 (1985) (describing “law”).
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Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L J 1073, 1075, 1086–87 (1984).
214
See Owen Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv L Rev 1, 30 (1979)
(suggesting arbitration). But see also iss, Against Settlement at 1087–88 (cited in note 213)
(doubting that judges could correctly assign cases to adjudication and settlement tracks).
215
See Fiss, Against Settlement at 1076–78, 1085–87 (cited in note 213).
216
Fiss, The Forms of Justice at 31, 34 (cited in note 214) (asserting the special
independence and dialogic abilities of courts). See also Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges,
96 Harv L Rev 374, 431 (1982) (“[T]he quintessential judicial obligations of conducting a
reasoned inquiry, articulating the reasons for decision, and subjecting those reasons to
appellate review . . . have long defined judging and distinguished it from other tasks.”).
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because they are provocatively idealistic. They point to the right
questions. Bickel, Dworkin, Fiss, and others dedicated to robust judicial
authority attempted to identify valuable features embedded in the design
of judiciaries that were not replicated in other institutions. One might
disagree with their conclusions, or believe that their analysis was
incomplete, while recognizing that these scholars made admirable
attempts to draw institutional comparisons.217 And courts are indeed
special institutions with an ineradicable relationship to the elaboration of
legal norms. Performing that function is, for them, unavoidable. Even
the Manual for Complex Litigation concedes that “[s]ome cases involve
important questions of law or public policy that are best resolved by
public, official adjudication.”218
Yet legitimate doubts about the claims of Fiss and others have, if
anything, deepened over the years. One serious concern is feasibility.
To the extent that anyone believed judges could take a leading role in a
large fraction of important legal questions, experience has not treated
that hope well. Courts have too few resources for that.219 They could
never fully stop settlement even if they stopped encouraging it, and they
will never accept review of every significant legal question. Even with
unlimited resources, a heroic view of the typical judiciary—perhaps the
extraordinary judiciary—is unrealistic. One part of the problem is
motivation, another is systemic, and yet another involves normative
disagreement.
Whatever capacity judges have for high-quality rationality insulated
from base politics, there is serious doubt that judges actually exercise
those capacities in most hard cases.220 Judges must be appointed
somehow and the system for acquiring the office, if nothing else,
connects them to ordinary politics. Although judges are not a
representative sample of the population, they are not especially well
chosen to share the normative goals of scholars like Fiss, either. Nor are
judges likely to posses the expertise or dedication necessary to perform a
justifiably leading role in norm creation. Courts are at most one
217

See Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 24–26 (cited in note 184) (comparing
courts and legislatures in addressing the so-called countermajoritarian difficulty); Ronald
Dworkin, Freedom’s Law 34–35 (1996) (recognizing that the institutional questions reduce
to practical considerations and results); Fiss, The Forms of Justice at 1–2, 31–34 (cited in
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institutional reform).
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Manual for Complex Litigation at 167 (cited in note 171).
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See Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives at 123, 251 (cited in note 132); Frederick
Schauer, Foreword: The Court’s Agenda—and the Nation’s, 120 Harv L Rev 4, 9, 49 (2006)
(arguing that most Supreme Court adjudication deals with non-salient, even if sometimes
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institutional participant and, as we have seen, they are often committed
to speaking last rather than first. Finally, the relevant norms are
controverted. People disagree, persistently, about the proper goals for
judiciaries in particular and government in general, just as they disagree
about the proper mix of bargaining and principle, deliberation and
decisiveness, politics and adjudication.
For the most part, courts cannot, will not, or should not take the lead
in public law generation.
b) Courts as lotteries. Other evaluations of law as a tiebreaker
are cheerier, although one of them will seem awkward at first.
Accepting the tiebreaking analogy, we can return to the bases for
evaluating tiebreakers developed in Part II.B.2, which emphasized
normative unimportance, clean decisiveness, potential costliness, and, on
occasion, double counting. We might then conclude that adjudication
performs its tiebreaking role well—if, oddly enough, judicial outcomes
are often arbitrary; or if, in the alternative, judiciaries effectively double
count societal norms.
Without question, adjudication is decisive with respect to individual
disputes. This seems to be the minimum goal of judges, anyway,
whether or not they can achieve the final word on broader questions of
fact and value. These decisionmakers offer decisive judgments on each
question that they choose to answer, and participants tend to respect
those judgments. Moreover, adjudication might qualify as the kind of
costly debate over controversial issues that may be best left for last. A
substantial price is entailed by any judicial process that aspires to
rational debate based on reliable information about the realities of social
life. Adjudication is a unique venue for contestation, and no one doubts
that litigation is costly.
The challenge in defending adjudication as one of life’s crucial
tiebreakers revolves around law’s normative value. Remember that
sound tiebreakers often rely on relatively unimportant variables to
provide decisive answers.
Hence as legal norms better reflect
fundamentally just norms of behavior, we might become less confident
that adjudication is a socially beneficial form of tiebreaking. Now, the
idea that the health of our legal system depends on its use of normatively
trivial decision rules is something less than intuitive. No official within
the system would associate with the notion that judicial adjudication is a
rough substitute for randomization. But there is logic behind the idea. It
is built on a few simple observations.
The first phenomenon worth noting is a selection effect on
adjudicated cases. With important caveats, it has long been suggested
that relatively difficult cases tend to be litigated and that the most
difficult of these tend to survive until trial and appeal. Other disputes
can be settled rationally and much earlier, at least if we assume that the
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parties’ expectations about a judgment on the merits are sufficiently
similar, that the stakes for them are comparable, and that the avoided
litigation costs are sufficiently high.221 Thus cases adjudicated on the
merits are probably not a random sample of all similar disputes, and the
sample’s peculiar character helps adjudication approach arbitrariness.
Nearly intractable disputes are theoretically most likely to linger until
judges and juries impose final judgment. These disputes, in turn, will be
least likely to have unique solutions that are uncontroversially optimal.
Uncertainty among parties translates into higher probability of litigation
to the end, and probably correlates with difficulty among judges in
reaching consensus.222 The outcome can be analogized to a coin flip, at
least from the litigants’ perspective.223
The point can be made, albeit less dramatically, for those not
convinced of a strong selection effect. Whether or not the pools of
settled and adjudicated cases are demonstrably different—and the
selection hypothesis in strong form has suffered major challenges224—no
one doubts that the pool of litigated cases includes extremely difficult
issues. There are too many disputes, complexities, unknowns, and goodfaith disagreements over means and ends for the truth to be otherwise.
221
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character of unlitigated cases regardless of the decision rule and in which, given certain
assumptions, the plaintiff win rate will be about 50 percent); Schauer at 1722–23, 1726–27
(cited in note 131) (finding similar thoughts in Karl Llewellyn’s work on appellate judging).
On the serious challenges for a model this simple, see generally Kevin M. Clermont and
Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 Cornell L Rev 119 (2002).
222
See Priest and Klein at 16–17 (cited in note 156).
223
See Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical
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224
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From the perspective of critical theorists and modern legal realists, the
domain of hard cases is large when only conventional legal analysis is
available; for others the domain is smaller but still present.225 We should
not anticipate clear answers, regardless of the test for clarity, in all or
even most of the closely contested cases. In many cases, merits
adjudication will be operating in the gray zone of reasonable debate.226
Judges themselves cannot really believe otherwise, regardless of the
certitude on display in published opinions.227 Reconsider in this light
Justice Jackson’s quip, “We are not final because we are infallible, but
we are infallible only because we are final.”228
Of course, judiciaries do not close their cases by overtly randomizing
across the set of plausible outcomes.229 Judges publish reasons and
juries are supposed to have them. Yet it turns out that merits judgments
are tightly connected to randomization, at least in the more challenging
cases. Within the jurisdictional boundaries of each adjudicative
institution, judges and juries are typically selected at random.230 Some
form of assignment lottery is now the norm. If all of these
decisionmakers were the same, the case assignment method would be
irrelevant to case outcomes. But neither sitting judges nor eligible jurors
are fungible, and every practicing lawyer knows it. Because these
potential decisionmakers differ in their competence and ideology, they
would reach different conclusions in some subset of litigated cases. In
fact, there is good reason to believe that the most difficult cases are the
ones in which competence and ideology are likely to have the most
225

See, for example, Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication (Fin de Siècle) 60
(Harvard 1997) (“[I]n many cases in which the ideological stakes are high, legal actors have
had a choice between two (or more) interpretations or definitions of a particular rule . . . .”);
Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Theory (Without Modifiers) in the United States, 13 J Pol Phil
99, 108 (2005) (noting moderated claims of critical legal theorists). Actually, decision will
sometimes be difficult, perhaps more difficult, when conventional legal analysis is
disregarded. Converting every litigated question into a “policy” question does not
necessarily simplify the matter. Consider Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 230–31
(Harvard 2008) (acknowledging that both legal reasoning and pragmatism can run out); Jack
M. Balkin, Deconstruction’s Legal Career, 27 Cardozo L Rev 719, 734 (2005) (suggesting
that “social construction . . . helped produce the internal sense in lawyers and judges that
some arguments were better than others”).
226
For characterizations of constitutional choices, see Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand
Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Colum L Rev 606, 663–64 (2008) (“[A]
host of constitutional design choices are subject to serious uncertainty regarding their
influence on any number of outcomes.”); Samaha, Undue Process at 625–29 (cited in note
133) (reviewing empirical literature for the preceding proposition).
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Opinions that are sometimes at odds. Compare District of Columbia v Heller, 128 S
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influence.231 Moreover, because randomization’s impact comes through
the case assignment mechanism, no individual judge or jury must be
irrational, nonrational, arbitrary, or even subjectively uncertain for the
analogy to hold. Each decisionmaker can be as resolute as humanly
possible. We need only debatable issues of fact or law plus a diverse set
of decisionmakers. Case assignment lotteries do the rest.
When we combine selection effects with a diverse set of
decisionmakers assigned to cases by lot, we have a system that begins to
approximate random selection. It is only an approximation, of course.
Among other differences with overt merits randomization, many
litigated cases nonetheless have a fairly obvious solution given an
appropriate amount of judicial effort, plus the range of answers in hard
cases that could be given by the mix of official decisionmakers is not
necessarily the same as the plausible set of merits outcomes.232 But the
influence of assignment randomization on outcomes is not really
debatable. And so the tiebreaker analogy for adjudication is a way to
feel better about the influence of chance. John Coons once wrote that
“[p]eople resist having their noses rubbed in the randomness of the
system,”233 but we have cause for qualified celebration of it.
c) Courts as reflections. If understanding law as a lottery seems
too sobering or too distant from ordinary perceptions to be worth the
upside of a defensible tiebreaker, a third perspective is more hopeful.
And it helps account for the treatment of relatively easy cases in
adjudication. I refer here to the thought that law’s officials, including
judges, often act in accord with mainstream or politically ascendant
policy preferences, and that this consistency might be a form of
beneficial double counting. To the extent that adjudication resolves the
episodic stalemates of social life with faintly modified versions of the
ordinary norms of social life, we could say that law has subtracted
nothing from the lexically superior stages of dispute resolution while
reinforcing those norms and performing the challenging task of breaking
every tie that it faces. This characterization might be more comforting
than randomization, and it too has substantial support in legal theory.
The law and society school of legal studies has been claiming for
years that legal norms more or less track forces external to legal
institutions. General claims of this type can be found in the works of
modern scholars including Lawrence Friedman, who sees law as
essentially a mirror of society,234 and they extend back through the
231
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232
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nineteenth century writings of Friedrich Karl von Savigny on the
relationship between the Volkgeist and law.235 These claims can be
maddeningly abstract, with references to vague forces amounting to “the
hidden voices of the zeitgeist.”236 But it is by now obvious that legal
institutions are not fully autonomous.
In addition, somewhat more specific assertions have been made
about the relationship between external and internal forces shaping law.
We have the traditional connections made between custom and
negligence,237 trade usage and contract interpretation,238 along with
religious beliefs and the criminal law.239 Some of these connections
might have faded over time, but there is a vibrant line of scholarship that
has softened the distinction between law and politics. This enormous
literature includes the observations of political scientists that judges
usually will not push beyond the boundaries of the political
mainstream,240 and the sense of social movement legal historians that
public and political discourse is linked to doctrinal development,
including constitutional doctrine.241 Indeed, there is a logical affinity
it is a distorted mirror. Perhaps in some regards society mirrors law. Surely law and society
interact. The central point remains: Law is the product of social forces, working in society.
If it has a life of its own, it is a narrow and restricted life.”); Lawrence M. Friedman, Law
and Society: An Introduction 107 (1977) (“In the long run, society molds legal thought in its
image.”).
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between these efforts and the selection effect studies, in that they too
identify chains of causation leading far beyond courthouse doors.
Although the connection between nonlegal forces and legal
institutions can be much better understood, along with the foggy
boundary between nonlegal and legal institutions, a relationship most
certainly exists. As legal institutions including courts adopt or adapt
ideas from other locations, a kind of double counting takes place. At an
earlier stage in a dispute, parties make claims relying in part on
conventional morality and typical practice but find themselves unable to
settle their disagreements. Occasionally these unresolved disputes find
their way to a judge, perhaps after some other legal official has
intervened, but without cutting loose the influence of nonlegal morality
and what seems normal for the circumstances.
It is of course true that what seems right and ordinary beyond the law
is influenced by the policy of legal institutions. Not every mainstream
norm has a mirror image in the reasoning process of judges and jurors;
surely the conventions of legal argument affect the implementation of
those norms. Nevertheless, we can now view courts as tiebreakers and
their tiebreakers as partly redundant—different enough from the norms
of ordinary life to effectively end residual disputes, and yet similar
enough to share whatever strengths and legitimacy they have. This is
not an unqualified endorsement of the system. But to the extent that the
norms from which judges and jurors draw are morally imperfect, the
target of our concern must be broader than our judiciaries.
A final thought in this path of logic involves incentive effects. The
major trouble with double counting a normatively relevant variable to
break ties is the possibility that actors will be too powerfully
incentivized to satisfy (or appear to satisfy) the double counted
variable.242 Knowing that a variable will be reintroduced at a tiebreaking
stage with some probability makes the variable that much more
significant to interested parties. Nor can there be an assurance that
socio-legal norms will be impervious to manipulation, and we must
admit the normative imperfection of at least some of these rules.
Perhaps this problematic effect is simply a tolerable price to pay for
a decisive dispute resolution system. But also worth reemphasizing is
the rarity of litigation and the likely lack of knowledge regarding the
specifics of legal norms among many. That legal norms are often not
shockingly different from social norms does not mean that ordinary
people pay attention to the former in conducting their everyday lives.
For individuals who end up in contact with the judicial system, often the
prospect of litigation was dim and unimportant to their behavior. Insofar
(“[T]here is no view from nowhere in constitutional law, no place for a Justice to stand that is
divorced from the culture and society in which the Court operates.”).
242
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as litigation strikes like lightning, incentive effects from double counting
will not be significant.
In the end, however, we should be willing to recognize that few
tiebreakers for social decisions are associated with perfect worlds. And,
unlike game designers, we are not engaged in the entertainment business
here. Both tiebreaking decision structures and the particular tiebreakers
that they employ are typically considered the best available response to
an environment falling short of ideal. Legal institutions are no different.
***
No one of these three perspectives is the complete story, of course.
Rationality, randomness, and reflection of social forces each characterize
one facet of our legal institutions, so none of them fully capture the role
of law and adjudication in our society. Perhaps the combination of
veritable randomization and double counting will overcome any
misgivings associated with adjudication’s demotion to late stages of
dispute resolution. I happen to find that conclusion attractive. But the
analytic framework is more important than one’s conclusion on this
score. Likening legal institutions to tiebreakers should instigate a
serious evaluation of these competing perspectives, and on the terms
established in this Article for evaluating all kinds of tiebreakers. At its
best, then, the tiebreaker analogy offers a fresh way to think about legal
institutions and a sensible way to judge them.
CONCLUSION
A tiebreaker can be defined as a type of lexically inferior decision
rule that ranks options when a lexically superior rule breaks down. The
tradeoffs involved in constructing such decision structures prompt the
question whether a tie would be truly intolerable and, if so, whether ties
can be prevented by adjustments to a unitary decision rule. If such
adjustments are impossible or inadequate, then the consequences of
various tiebreakers are now clearer: random variables with their political
problems, relevant variables with their error costs, and double counted
variables with their potential incentive effects.
These insights are valuable. Tiebreakers are part of decisionmaking
within legal institutions today, and legal institutions themselves can be
evaluated as tiebreakers. Whatever conclusions one might reach on the
particular applications explored above, this Article offers a productive
way to identify and assess tiebreaking decision structures. And whatever
nuances remain to be explored, the general analytical framework
suggested above is enough to bring a unique and theoretically neglected
tool for decisionmaking into the fold of legal studies.
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